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CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS
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PmuX MARCUS*

TORIES of civil rights and accounts of anti-trust prosecutions

sometimes make the same front page. Rarely, if ever, is a connection made between the two. John Doe, whose life, liberty, or social
and economic status becomes the subject of legal controversy is not readily
identified with John Doe, the curtailment of whose liberty of action becomes the occasion for an anti-trust suit. But neither are those who invoke
the Bill of Rights to protect their civil rights readily identified with those
who invoke the Bill of Rights as a defense to an anti-trust prosecution.
As will be seen from the discussion throughout this article, the term
"civil rights" is being used in a broader sense than rights which the courts
have thus far found in the Constitution. The "civil rights" referred to
here consist generally of the opportunities and protections by which social, political, and economic success or well-being are made available to
more than a preferred few.
It is the purpose of this article to examine generally to what extent, if
any, the anti-trust laws may be made available for the protection of civil
rights. It is then proposed to explore the problem in several fields specifically.'
I. Tim SCOPE or = ANTI-TRUST LAWS
Mankind's concern over monopolies and restraints of trade and attempts to prohibit them go back to ancient times.2 The right to be protected against monopolies and unreasonable restraints was one successful* Member of the New York bar.
x The application of the anti-trust laws to restraints on the dissemination of information
has been discussed elsewhere. Marcus, Anti-trust Laws and the Right To Know, 24 Ind. L.J.
513 (1949).
Shelton, Unlawful Trade Combinations in History, i A.B.A.J. 123 (1926).
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ly fought for in England and deeply cherished in this country. 3 It was a
right of immediate concern to many persons, to whom it meant either
the ability to obtain their needs or their ability to enter trade. Considerable attention was paid to preventing a growing society from being
4
shackled by monopoly and restraints in the early history of this country.
That restraints of trade and monopolies are wrongs which give rise to
rights under the common law is not likely to be denied. Dispute is more
likely to arise over the question of whether statutory and common law
protect civil rights not wholly or directly concerned with making a living,
or, conversely, whether action not immediately intended, or not at all
intended, to affect a business enterprise or commercial transaction comes
within the ban of the anti-trust laws. More simply, when, if at all, do the
anti-trust laws become applicable to an act of social discrimination?
The Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights emphasized
four basic rights and recognized that many serious restrictions on the
exercise of these rights stem from private rather than government action.
It is, of course, within the field of private restraints that the anti-trust
laws have peculiar applicability. It is the thesis of this article that the
anti-trust laws are applicable to many of the rights referred to in the
Report of the President's Committee, especially "The Right to Equal
Opportunity." Advocacy of this position does not mean that the language
of anti-trust statutes compels its acceptance. Judicial recognition of this
thesis has been infrequent. But we shall show that here and there civil
rights have received strong support from the anti-trust laws; here and
there a connection between the two has been recognized. We think we can
demonstrate that the anti-trust laws can be made available, in many instances, for the promotion and protection of civil rights. For the most
part, anti-trust cases do not use the language of civil rights. Yet some of
the most eloquent discussions of civil rights have stemmed from concern
over monopolies and restraints of trade. 6 Not uncommonly, moreover, the
3Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 35 Yale L.J. 905
(1926); Jones, ibid., 36 Yale L.J. 42, 207, 351 (1926, 1927).
4Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 Yale L.J. 42 (1926).
s President's Committee on Civil Rights 6-9 (1947). For an even broader enumeration of
economic and social rights, see Merriam, The Content of an International Bill of Rights, 243
Annals 11, 13-15 (1946). See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948.
6In Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., iii U.S. 746 (1884), the Court affirmed the
right of a state to terminate a monopoly it had previously granted. This was a sequel to the
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36 (1872), where a monopoly had been protected
against the reach of the 13th, i4th and 15th Amendments. In a concurring opinion, Field, J.,
referred to the Declaration of Independence and said, at 757:
"Among these inalienable rights, as proclaimed in that great document, is the right of men
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Declaration of Independence is invoked in restraint cases.7
The relationship between personal liberties and freedom of trade is not
one of recent recognition." The common law tainted combinations to lower
or raise wages, or to diminish the length of the working day, with the
same illegality as combinations to raise prices.9
The primary concern of the anti-trust laws is, of course, the protection
of economic rights. But these "economic rights" are themselves generally
"civil rights." The anti-trust laws do not cease to apply when the immediate effect of their application is more apparent in fields other than that of
anti-trust, in fields other than economic. In the world in which we live
social discrimination is intimately connected with economic discrimination and a repression of "social" liberties is likely to have important economic consequences. Gunnar Myrdal has pointed out that "[t]here is a
fundamental flaw in that distinction between what is purely social and all
to pursue their happiness, by which is meant the right to pursue any lawful business or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may increase their
prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to give to them their highest enjoyment.
"The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits, which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in all communities from time immemorial,
must, therefore, be free in this country to all alike upon the same conditions. The right to
pursue them, without let or hindrance, except that which is applied to all persons of the same
age, sex and condition, is a distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States, and an
essential element of that freedom which they claim as their birthright."
In the same case three judges concurred, at 762, in the statementthatthe Case of Monopolies
and the Act of 21 James I (Statute of Monopolies), "form one of the constitutional landmarks
of British liberty, like the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus act and other great constitutional acts of Parliament. They established and declared one of the inalienable rights of freemen which our ancestors brought with them to this country. The right to follow any of the
common occupations of life is an inalienable right; it was formulated as such under the phrase
'pursuit of happiness' in the Declaration of Independence, which commenced with the fundamental proposition that, 'all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' This right is a large ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen. To deny it to all but a
few favored individuals by investing the latter with a monopoly is to invade one of the fundamental privileges of the citizen, contrary not only to common right, but, as I think, to the express words of the Constitution."
7Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., " i U.S. 746 (1884); Frazer v. Shelton, 32o Ill.
265, I5o N.E. 696, 701 (1926).

253,

8 "The principle that trade should be free from arbitrary restraints is implied in the clauses
of Magna Charta which relate to the liberty of the subject, and to trade; and the medieval
judges favoured the principle, just as they favoured the principle of freedom of alienation, because they were hostile to all arbitrary restrictions on personal liberty, or rights of property,
for which no legal justification could be shown." Holdsworth, Industrial Combinations and the
Law in the Eighteenth Century, i8 Minn. L. Rev. 369, 371-72 (I934).
9 Ibid., at 373-74. Holdsworth was of the opinion that, historically, combinations of
workers or masters aimed at controlling wages and hours were bad at common law as restraints
of trade. Ibid., at 377 ff. Compare Cohen, The Canadian Anti-trust Laws-Doctrinal and
Legislative Beginnings, i6 Can. Bar Rev. 439, 44x-46 (1938).
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the rest of discrimination against Negroes. Social discriminationis powerful as a means of keeping the Negroes down in all other respects.... The interrelations between social status and economic activity are particularlyimportant."' Social and economic liberties are part of our best known single
definitions of liberty.In applying the anti-trust laws, the courts generally have looked to the
economic effect, intended or actual, of a restraint or monopoly upon the
persons against whom the restraint or monopoly, was directed. Increasingly, however, the overriding consideration in determining whether the
anti-trust laws have been violated has been the likelihood of detriment to
the public," so that courts today consider both harm to the individual

and harm to society as a whole. We argue here that a restraint which is
concerned with, and generally understood as, a"social" wrong should not
be immune from the anti-trust laws if it has economic significance. Normally, the anti-trust laws apply to group activity, and much of the continuing force of discrimination rests in its promoti6n or support by a
group. 13 The important factors to be considered are whether the subject
matter comes within the anti-trust laws, and, with respect to the Sherman
Act, whether the requisite interstate commerce is involved.
The Sherman Act,'1 under which most of our anti-trust law has been
developed, prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint
of trade or commerce among the states or foreign nations.' s Its prohibitions extend to those who monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or combine and conspire to monopolize any part of interstate or foreign trade or
10 Myrdal, An American Dilemma 642 (i944). And see Ellington, The Right To Work, 243
Annals 27, 31 (1946): "In fact, all the essential rights are interdependent." See also Evatt, Economic Rights in the United Nations Charter, 243 Annals 4, 5 (i946).
" "The liberty mentioned in that amendment [I4th] means not only the right of the citizen
to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be
free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood or
avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and
essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned." Allgeyer v. Louisiana, i65 U.S. 578, 589 (x897). See Property-Restrictive Covenants--Racial
Discrimination in New York, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 301, 307-8 (1947), arguing that civil
rights include property rights.
12 See page 175 infra.
'3

Compare Berger, The Supreme Court and Group Discrimination since 1937, 49 Col. L.

Rev. 201 (1949).
'426 Stat. 209 (i8go), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2, 3 (I94x). The Claytoii Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 14
(1941), supplements the Sherman Act but is more limited in subject matter (commodities).

However, it has been applied to patent-licensing royalty agreements. Hartford Empire Co. v.
United States, 323 U.S. 386 (i945).
"526 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. § I (1941).
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commerce."6 Section 3 declares illegal contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce within the District of Columbia
7
and within the territories.
Of the Sherman Act it has been said, "As a charter of freedom, the Act
has a generality comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional
provisions."' 8 It is the standard of harm to the common good and to the
economic freedom of the individual that should set bounds within which
the statute is to operate. 9 The reach of the anti-trust laws is measured by
the breadth of mind of the judges who interpret them, as well as the zeal
of those who enforce them. For the most part the phrase "trade and commerce" in the Sherman Act has been liberally construed. It has been said
that "there has been an apparent reluctance to place a limitation on the
meaning of those words as used in the Act."'' Its ambit has been gradually
and perceptibly widened by the Supreme Court.
Although the Sherman Act was occasioned by concern over the growth
of huge aggregations of capital, its scope, in view of the breadth of its language, has not been so limited.2 The early days of the Sherman Act were
marked by its use to break strikes." It has been used against German
agents and others fomenting labor unrest and employing other means to
obstruct the production of arms for use abroad' 3 such as blowing up
4
plants.'
Although anti-trust provisions are found in the constitutions and statutes of many states, state governments have for the most part shown little
disposition to invoke them.25 Moreover, the scope of state anti-trust
statutes is often very difficult to ascertain. Some relate merely to commodities, to articles of manufacture, or to produce of the soil. Others
Stat. 209 (i89o), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (i94i).
'726 Stat. 209 (i89o), i5 U.S.C.A. § 3 (194i).
'gAppalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).

1626

19United States v. American Tobacco Co.,

221 U.S. io6, 183 (i91i).
oDiener Cleaners, Inc. v. Vogue D.C. Co., ii F.A.D. 479,480 (D.C.,
i86 infra. But see note 77 infra.
2

193o).

See also page

21In United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724, 746-47 (C.C. Ill.,
1894), the court expressly rejected the contention that the Sherman Act was aimed only at vast aggregations of capital.

- Ibid.
23United States v. Rintelen, 233 Fed. 793 (D.C. N.Y., 1916); Lamar v. United States,
26o Fed. 561 (C.A. 2d, i919), cert. den. 250 U.S. 673 (i919).

'4

United States v. Bopp, 237 Fed. 283 (D.C. Cal., i916).

2"Compare Nutting, The Texas Anti-trust Law: A Post Mortem,
299-300

(1936); The Illinois Anti-trust Law Disinterred, 43 Ill. L. Rev.

14 Tex. L. Rev.
205

(1948).

293,
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relate to articles in common use'S or to commodities which are the subject
of commerce. Still others refer in one section to trade and commerce in
general and in another to manufactured or grown products.2 7 It is difficult to determine in any one statute whether it is merely an adoption of
the provisions of other statutes, or whether it represents a deliberate attempt on the part of the legislature to limit its scope.
Although some courts have held that combinations and restraints in
service enterprises are not within the anti-trust laws, the more widely
26Theatre tickets have been assumed to come under such statutes. Foster v. Shubert Holding Co., 316 Mass. 470, 55 N.E. 2d 772 (1944).
27See A Collection and Survey of State Anti-trust Laws, 32 Col. L. Rev. 347 (1932), 43
Ill. L. Rev. 205, 221 (1948). Some courts have emasculated the generallanguage by confining its
scope to specific definitions of prohibited acts. Schow Bros. v. Adva Talks Co., 232 S.W. 883
(Tex. Civ. App., 1921). In Duggan Abstract Co. v. Moore, 139 S.W. 2d ig8 (Tex. Civ. App.,
i94o), the court held restrictions on the abstract business not unlawful by strictly construing
the state statute to refer only to merchandise, produce and commodities. See also Nassman v.
Bank of New York, 49 N.Y.S. 2d 181 (i944), in which bidding on real estate was held not
within the local anti-trust statute which, the court said, related basically to necessities in the
form of vendible tangibles. This seems a narrow construction. In Hotel Edison Corp. v. Taylor,
268 N.Y. App. Div. 1029 (r944), it was held that the act did not apply to a combination
creating a monopoly in copyrighted musical compositions. This decision was by the same judges
who decided the Nassman case. That case was affirmed without opinion by both New York
appellate courts, 268 N.Y. App. Div. xo89, 295 N.Y. 58i, 64 N.E. 2d 284 ('945), but its rationale was rejected by another judge of the same court. Leader Theatre Corp. v. Randforce,
186 N.Y. Misc. 280, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 304 (1945). The Duggan case is to be compared with an
Opinion of the Attorney Generalof Texas, Sept. io, 1942, Trade Reg. Serv. 52, 841, holding
that an agreement among all the banks of a city to set minimum-average balances violated
the state anti-trustlaws. In Speegle Co. v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 172 P. 2d
867 (x946), insurance was held to be a commodity. Compare Application of Richardson,
184 P. 2d 642 (1947).
Some states' anti-trust statutes follow the language of the Sherman Act, e.g., 2 Me. Rev.
Stats. (1944) c. 124, §§ 37-42. Others seem more narrow than the Sherman Act, e.g., Ill. Rev.
Stat. (1949) c. 38, § 569. In a number of states the anti-trust statutes are in terms broader than
the federal statutes. Compare Ind. Stats. Ann. (Baldwin, 1934) c. 24, § 4767-99. In Louisiana
a constitutional anti-trust provision refers to trade, commerce or business. La. Const. Art. i9,
§ X4. Its statutes, however, refer to trade and commerce. La. Gen. Stats. (Dart, 1939) § 4906.
Under these statutes the business of operating a laundry was held not to be "trade and commerce." State v. McClellan, 155 La. 495,,98 So. 748 (1924). A contrary result has been reached
under the later constitutional provision which is self-executing. Cleaners, Dyers & Pressers v.
G.H.W. Cleaners & Dyers, 2oo La. 8_3,7 So. 2d 623 (1942). The Louisiana statutes liberalize
rules of evidence so as to facilitate proof of anti-trust violations. La. Gen. Stats. (Dart, 1939)
§ 4921. In Wisconsin, newspapers and advertising are expressly included as subjects of the
state's anti-trust laws. Wisc. Stat. (Brossard, 1947) § i33.oi. New York's anti-trust statutes
include competition in, or free exercise of, any activity in manufacturing, production, transportation, marketing, service or supply, as well as the free pursuit of any lawful business,
trade or occupation. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law (McKinney, 1941) § 340. In Alabama, the State
Constitution requires that the legislature provide for the protection of reasonable competition
in any calling, trade or business. Ala. Const. § io3. Contracts restraining one from exercising a
lawful profession, trade or business are void. Code of Ala. (Michie, 1940) tit. 9, § 22. In Montana there is a similar statute. Mont. Rev. Code (i947) tit. 13, § 807.
In Arizona, a trust is defined, among other things, as a combination of capital, skills, or
acts by two or more persons, to create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce or aids to
commerce, or to carry out restrictions in the full and free pursuit of any business authorized

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS

adopted rule is that
at common law, as well as under state and federal
8
are.2
they
statutes,
Rules of law have been developed which determine the application of 1
the anti-trust laws to varied situations. An anti-trust case is made out by
proof of the fact of conspiracy, although overt acts need not be proved.29
Nor is actual success in impeding competition a necessary condition.30
If the necessary consequence of a conspiracy is to produce a result which
the anti-trust laws are designed to prevent, the conspirators are "in legal
contemplation chargeable with intending that result."' 3Z What one may
legally do alone may be illegal if done in concert with another; a series of
contracts may have illegal consequences which would not exist were

there only a single contract. 32 An unlawful agreement or conspiracy may
be implied from a concert of action, which, in turn, may be inferred from
similarity of action. 3 Acts innocent by themselves may properly be
enjoined if they appear to be steps in a conspiracy, and agreements which
or permitted by law. Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §§ 74-1o. Florida and Texas have like statutory
provisions. Fla. Stats. (i949) § 542.01; Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, X925) Art. 7426; Tex. Pen.
Code (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1632. See also Kan. Gen. Stats. (Corrick, 1935), § So.zoi, expressly
condemning arrangements tending to fix attorneys' or doctors' fees. Ibid., § 50.112. Michigan
has a somewhat similar but more limited definition (aids to commerce and "business" omitted).
Mich. Stats. Ann. (1942) §§ 6624, 6625. In Arkansas, the anti-trust laws apply to restrictions
on the price or quantity of commodities, convenience or repair or anything whatsoever.
Monopolies include combinations of property, customs, skill or acts by or between persons or
associations of persons for such purposes. Ark. Stats. (1948) § 70-105. See also S.C. Civ.
Code (1942) §§ 6624, 6625. But the narrowness of a court's approach may substantially
curtail the breadth of such statute. Compare State v. Frank, izi Ark. 47, 169 S.W. 3 3 3
(1914), in which an agreement fixing the price of laundering was held not within the statute.
In Michigan it is illegal to contract not to engage in any association, employment, pursuit,
trade, profession or business, and a combination to effect a monopoly in one of these is
also forbidden, with a few exceptions. In Oklahoma a duty to render service or offer commodities without discrimination has been imposed on a business which, by reason of its
nature, extent, or virtual monopoly, the public must use. Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 79, § 4.
28 The Legality of Combinations To Restrain Competition in Services, 25 Col. L. Rev. 647
(1925). But see Carlton v. Manuel, 64 Nev. 570, 187 P. 2d 558 (i947).
29Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
30 United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 307 (Ohio, 1949).
31United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913).
32United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 311 (X948); United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394 (1948); United States v. Reading, 226 U.S. 324, 357
(1912); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 339-40 (1904); United States
v. Pullman Co., 5o F. Supp. 123, 127-28 (Pa., 1943); United States Telephone Co. v. Central
Union Telephone Co., 202 Fed. 66, 71 (C.A. 7 th, 1912), cert. den. 229 U.S. 620 (193); American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F. 2d 406 (C.A. 7th, 1934).
33 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 31o F. 2d 877 (C.A. 7th,
1945), rev'd on other grounds 327 U.S. 251 (1946); William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's,
Inc., '1o F. 2d 738 (C.A. 3d, 1945), cert. den. 334 U.S. 8x (1948).
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might be legal standing alone may be stricken to enforce Sherman Act
34
standards.
Anti-trust suits have been brought against individuals alone for activities- concerning corporations with which they were associated. 3s It is
common also to bring Sherman Act suits against both a corporation and
its officers and directors. 36 Officers and directors may be held liable as
principals where their acts are in furtherance of a conspiracy,37 even
though the overt acts are those of the corporation and even though the
corporation itself is absolved. 38 Conversely, the corporation or organization charged with conspiring with individuals may be held liable while the
individuals are exonerated. 39 Commonly, however, officers are found
guilty of conspiring with their corporations in violation of the anti-trust
acts. 40 The anti-trust laws include conspiracies between parent and sub2
sidiary corporations 4' and between corporations and inividuals.4
34 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (i944); Ethyl Gasoline Corp.
v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 46. (I94o); Swift & Co. v. United States, x96 U.S. 375 (,905).
3sUnited States v. Swift, i88 Fed. 92 (D.C. Ill., 19i); Patterson v. United States, 222
Fed. 599 (C.A. 6th, iz5), cert. den. 238 U.S. 635 (x915); see United States v. Atlantic Commission Co., 45 F. Supp. i87, 19 4 (N.C., 1942).

36For example, United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., i49 Fed. 823, 832 (D.C. N.Y.,
i906), appeal dismissed 212 U.S. 585 (1908). "It is now well settled that officers and agents
may be indicted with their corporations under the Sherman Act." United States v. Atlantic
Commission Co., 45 F. Supp. 187, 194 (N.C., 1942). Under Section 14 of the Clayton Act,
directors, officers, and agents of a corporation who have been instrumental in a penal violation
of the Sherman Act by the corporation are subject to a derivative liability.
It is well settled that "neither in the civil nor in the criminal law can an officer protect
himself behind a corporation where he is the actual, present, and efficient actor." United States
v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 578, 581 (D.C. Mass., 1912), aff'd on different grounds 227 U.S. 202
(1913). Accord: Kelly v. United States, 258 Fed. 392, 401 (C.A. 6th, 1g91), cert. den. 249 U.S.
616 (i919). In People v. Duke, ig N.Y. Misc. 292, 44 N.Y. Supp. 336 (i897), an indictment
charged certain officers of the American Tobacco Co. with conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Defendants advanced as a ground for demurrer the argument that the defendants' acts were
the acts of the corporation, that the corporation was one person and therefore the indictment
did not lie. Said the court: "I do not think that individuals can shield themselves from the
consequences of wrongdoing by pleading that their wrongful acts were corporate acts."
37 United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., x49 Fed. 823, 832 (D.C.N.Y., i9o6), appeal
dismissed 212 U.S. 585 (i9o8).
38 Tribolet v. United States, ii Ariz. 436 (igoS).
39 United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F. 2d 376 (C.A. 7th, 1941), cert. den. 314
U.S. 618 (194i); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 13o F. 2d 233, 253 (App. D.C.,
1942), aff'd 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
40 This was true of the findings and judgment, as well as the opinions, in United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (I944), and Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United
States, 334 U.S: ixo (1948). But see United States v. American Naval Stores Co., 172 Fed.
455, 463 (C.C. Ga., 1909).

41 Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. XIo (1948); United States v.
Yellow Cab CO., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F. 2d 376,
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A conspiracy in restraint of trade is no less illegal because one or more
of the conspirators is a non-profit organization. 43 Nor is it necessary under
the Sherman Act to allege or to prove that the conspirators themselves are
traders. 44 Rights of exclusion which appertain to ownership can be given
only attenuated effect once the owner opens up his property to access for
profit.4.
The Sherman Act applies, of course, only to unreasonable restraints.
In determining what is an unreasonable restraint, a defendant's position
in an industry may be the determining factor, where the law is not otherwise clear. 46 Monopoly power or dominant position may carry with it
obligations ordinarily appertaining only to public utilities. Thus a nunber of courts have denied to the possessor of monopolistic power the right
to discriminate or to impose upon persons dealing with it conditions designed to foster such power or position.47 Moreover, monopoly or restraints
404 (C.A. 7th, 1941), cert. den. 314 U.S. 618 (1941). See also Schenley Distillers Corp. v.
United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946). Agreements to deal exclusively with a third concern
are not made legal because those who agree have a proprietary interest in the third company.
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 400 (X912); Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); National Harrow Co. v. Hench, 83 Fed. 36
(C.A. 3d, 1897). It has been held that a conspiracy among affiliated companies to exclude a
competitor from a source of supply by the conspirators' acquisition of the source and refusal
to sell to him is within the Sherman Act. Ronald Fabrics Co. v. Verney Brunswick Mills, Inc.
C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv. 57,514 (D.C.N.Y., 1946).
42For example, Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. ix0 (1948). An
allegation to this effect is fairly frequent in federal anti-trust complaints. See note 36 supra.
43 Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. FTC, 13 F. 2d 673 (C.A. 8th, 1926).
44 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1gr3). But some state statutes refer only to restraints by those in business.
4SMarsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 5oi (1946); United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc.,
63 F. Supp. 32 (Minn., 1945).
46 Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 6oo (1936); Standard Oil Co. of
N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. i (igI); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis,
224 U.S. 383 (i912).
47 Tallassee Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. H.S. & J.L. Holloway, 2oo Ala. 492, 76 So. 434 (1917),
injunction at behest of competitor lies where cotton-gin company having a monopoly refused
to gin cotton unless cotton owners agree to sell their cotton seed to it. In Greenleaf v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 79 F. Supp. 362 (Pa., 1947), a noted pool and billiard player
brought suit under the Sherman Act, charging that as part of a plan to monopolize billiard
equipment, defendant had failed to invite plaintiff to participate in the National Billiard
Tournament, sponsored by defendant. In an exhibition Greenleaf had used equipment of
another company and apparently aroused the ire of the defendant who customarily tied, or
attempted to tie, the players to the use of its equipment. The court in denying a motion for
summary judgment said: "Thus an illegal monopoly cannot discriminate against or refuse to
deal with a person without sufficient cause." Compare Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945); American Federation of Tobacco Growers, Inc. v. Neal, r83 F. 2d 869
(C.A. 4 th, I95O), C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv. 62,675 (ig5o). As to the relation of monopoly
power to the obligation of nondiscrimination imposed upon public utilities, see Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 Yale L.J. 426, n. 78 (1948).
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with respect to essential needs have been the subject of particular concern
to the law. 45 The courts, not infrequently, have shown a more marked

readiness to find illegal monopoly or restraint where essential needs 49 or
basic rights s° have been involved. It has been pointed out that the Sher-

man Act embraces "every conceivable act which could possibly come
within the spirit or purpose of the prohibitions of the law, without regard
to the garb in which such acts [are] dothed."' ' The fact that in a given
situation the emphasis may be on an act of social discrimination should no
more affect their application than when the emphasis shifts from a local
engrosser of corn to an international cartel, from guilds to unions, from
potatoes to newspapers?
The breadth of injunctive relief in civil anti-trust cases has been very
broad, even including the relationship of an individual to a particular
group or organization, negative and mandatory injunctions, and the dissolution of organizations. If the anti-trust laws apply to civil rights, reme3
dies are dearly available to redress violations of these rights.5
II.

TEE INTERSTATE PROBLEM

It may be doubted that the power of the federal government with respect to monopolies and restraints of trade is limited to its interstate and
foreign commerce power. In time of war and preparedness for defense, it
would seem clear that monopolies and restraints could be dealt with under
48 In some states anti-trust statutes are confined to necessities of life, a distinction not made
at common law. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 286-87 (C.A.
6th, z898), modified on different grounds 175 U.S. 211 (x899). The Court noted a different
view taken by some Massachusetts cases; see Foster v. Shubert Holding Co., 316 Mass. 470,
55 N.E. 2d 772 (1944), involving theatre tickets.
49United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, z66 U.S. 290, 333-34 (1896);
American Biscuit & Mfg. Co. v. Klotz, 44 Fed. 721 (C.C. La., 1891), bread for the poor and
the rich.
50 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (N.Y., 1943); Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1945); Inter-Ocean Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 184 IL.
438, 453, 56 N.E. 822, 826 (igoo). Compare United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
S United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 1o6, 181 (1911).

s2Compare the expansion of the state-action doctrine to protect civil liberties as described in The Disintegration of a Concept-State Action under the i 4 th and i5th Amendments, 96 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 402 (1948). The 13th Amendment has been made the source of a
right to hold property, as against a conspiracy which was aimed at denying that right to
Negroes. United States v. Morris, 125 Fed. 322 (D.C. Ark., 19o3).
S3Daniel, Enforcement of the Sherman Act by Actions for Treble Damages, 34 Va. L. Rev.
901 (1948); Marcus, Patents, Antitrust Law and Antitrust Judgments through HartfordEmpire, 34 Geo. L.J. 1, 36 ff.(1945); Standards Governing Relief under Section 4 of the
Sherman Act, 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 231, 238 (1948).

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS

the government's war powers.5 4 It may well be that the carrying out of the
government's other express powers could entail a broad treatment of
monopolies and restraints. We have mentioned the attention paid by the
courts in monopoly suits to the Declaration of Independence and the Pre5
amble to the Constitution.
The Sherman Act, however, is based upon the commerce powers of
Congress. It is enforced not only by the Anti-trust Division of the Department of Justice, but also by the Federal Trade Commission, s6 and by private litigants. In the latter case, neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant 58
in an anti-trust suit need be in interstate commerce. It has been said,
repeatedly, by the Supreme Court that Congress meant to exercise its
interstate powers to the fullest extent in the Sherman Act.5 9 The courts,
therefore, have generally been inclined to find the requisite interstate or
foreign commerce for application of the Sherman Act where a challenge
has been made on that score." In approaching the question of whether
54 Compare Commonwealth v. Dyer, 243 Mass. 472, 138 N.E. 296 (1922), cert. den. 262
U.S. 751 (1923). Indictment for common-law conspiracy to create a monopoly and enhance
the price of fish. Violation of the state's anti-trust laws was alleged. The court doubted that at
common law monopolizing was a crime, but thought that detriment to the public in time of
war would support the proceeding. Broad regulation of intrastate prices, which is not possible
under the interstate commerce power, is possible under the war powers.
ss See notes 6 and 7 supra.

s6 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (3948).
s7 Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (i9o6); Ring v. Spina, 348 F. 2d 647
(C.A. 2d, 1945); Dowd v. United Mine Workers of America, 235 Fed. i (C.A. 8th, 1916),
appeal dismissed 241 U.S. 692 (i9i6).
s8 United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 541 (1933); United States v. Mountain States
Lumber Dealers Ass'n, 40 F. Supp. 46o (Colo., i94i).
59United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 298 (i945); United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553, 558 (I944); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 3io
U.S. 469,495 (194o); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyersv. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
6oFor example in Ramsay Co. v. Bill Posters Ass'n, 26o U.S. 5oi (3923), solicitors of advertising in the business of posting bills could maintain suit. In H.B. Marienelli v. United
Booking Offices of America, 227 Fed. i65 (D.C.N.Y., 1914), vaudeville owners agreed not to
employ anyone not booked through a certain corporation, so as to blacklist players playing
outside two circuits, and to blacklist players and theatres not exclusively dealing with them.
Judge Learned Hand thought certain aspects of the business, such as the booking of contracts, the carrying of paraphernalia, and the sending of advertising matter were in interstate commerce. The court was concerned over the apparent attempt and power to monopolize
the supply of first-class players. This case is to be compared with Hart v. Keith Vaudeville
Exchange, 12 F. 2d 341 (C.A. 2d, 1926). In Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F. 2d o3
(C.A., 7th, 3946), it was held that advertisements were part of preliminary negotiations for a
sale and are themselves a part of interstate commerce. Sales by wholesalers to retailers at the
beginning and at the end of an interstate journey have been held to come within the Sherman
Act. FTC v. Pacific States Paper Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52, 64 (1927); United States v. Women's
Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 46o (1949); Greater New York Live Poultry C. of C. v. United
States, 47 F. 2d i56, 159 (C.A. 2d, 1931), cert. den. 283 U.S. 837 (i93i); Gardella v. Chandler,
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facts alleged show interstate commerce sufficient to sustain a Sherman
Act suit, the "collective effect of all the facts, if true," which are alleged
must be considered. 6' And it is clear that the transaction inveighed against
need not itself be an interstate transaction. It is enough if it affects interstate commerce in a manner which is not de minimis2 The interstate incident of a sale or other transaction may suffice to bring the transaction
63
within the Sherman Act. So does the actual transportation of something.
It is well established that even if the primary object of a conspiracy is a
local competitive situation it falls within the Sherman Act if interstate
operations are necessary to carry out the conspiracy.6 4 "Competitive
practices which are wholly intrastate may be reached by the Sherman
Act because of their injurious effect on interstate commerce."6 5 The
statement sometimes found in judicial opinions that the interference with
interstate commerce must be direct and not incidental,6 does not appear
to be consistent with more recent holdings. 67 Occasionally the courts
have refused to find the necessary interstate commerce on facts which
might well have called for a different decision, 68 but for the most part they
are decisions of an earlier date.
192 F. 2d 402 (C.A. 2d, 1949); United States v. Chrysler Corp., i8o F. 2d 557 (C.A. 9th, 195o);

United States v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 77 F. Supp. 853 (Mo., 1948). See, The Concept of Interstate Commerce as Defined By the Anti-trust Cases, 35 Col. L. Rev. 1072 (1935).
61 Swift & Co. v. United States, i96 U.S. 375, 398 (i9o5). See Musical Monopolies and
Legislative Control, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 458, 464 (294o).
62 Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). United
States v. Universal Milk Bottle Service, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 622 (Ohio, 1949).
63 United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 546-47 (1944); Currin
v. Wallace, 3o6 U.S. 1, 10 (i939); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291, 309 (1923);
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398, 399 (igoS); Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193

U.S. 38, 47-48

(I9O4);

Gibbs v. M'Neeley, 118 Fed.

X20, 123

(C.A. 9th,

1902).

64Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291 (1923); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries
324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945). Speaking of an attempt to prevent a motion picture operator in
Philadelphia from securing pictures on a first run showing, the court said: "We know of no
authority which sanctions what would otherwise be an illegal monopoly simply because it
operates in a single city or a particular part of the city and affects only a part of an industry
involved." William Goldman Theatres v. Loew's, Inc., iSo F. 2d 738, 744 (C.A. 3d, i945),
cert. den. 334 U.S. Si1 (1948). See also Indiana Farmers Guide Co. v. Prairie Co., 293 U.S. 268,
279 (I934); Greater New York Live Poultry C. of C. v. United States, 47 F. 2d 156, 159
(C.A. 2d, 1931), cert. den. 283 U.S. 837 (1931). United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315
U.S. 110, 120 (1942).
6
5 Compare Food and

Grocery Bureau of Southern California v. United States, I39 F. 2d

973 (C.A. 9th, i944).
66 For example Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 20,
209 (1922).
67 Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
68Blumenstock Bros. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U.S. 436 (1920), involved the making of

contracts for insertion of advertising in periodicals of national circulation. Since the com-
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In view of the scope of the interstate commerce power said by the
courts to have been exercised by Congress in the Sherman Act, analogies
under other acts resting on the commerce power would seem apposite.
The National Labor Relations Act has been applied to companies operating the street railways and bus systems of Baltimore, Maryland. The
court has taken into consideration that many passengers were engaged
in the production of goods flowing in interstate commerce, that to run the
buses, the company brought in large supplies of materials from out of the
state, and that it transported passengers, mail, and newspapers moving in
interstate commerce.6 9 How substantial an effect on interstate commerce
need be to invoke the Sherman Act may not be as clear as fifty years of
litigation ought to have determined. It is clear that a conspiracy is not
immune because the amount of commerce conspired to be restrained or
monopolized is small.7
plaint alleged the defendants acted to control the advertising which other competing periodicals
could otherwise have had an opportunity to secure, the Court showed a lack of knowledge or
disdain for the economic consequences of the conspiracy which present-day courts are hardly
likely to be guilty of. The Court relied on insurance cases which have since been overruled.
In that case and in some other cases the courts have not made clear whether they are deciding
there is not interstate commece involved or whether trade or commerce is lacking. For example Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922),
conspiring to monopolize baseball business: "personal effort not related to production, is not a
subject of commerce"; Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 12 F. 2d 34I (C.A. 2d, 1926),
cert. den. 273 U.S. 703, 704 (1926), booking vaudeville held merely personal service, interstate

commerce with respect to moving paraphernalia, etc., is incidental and slight. Utah-Idaho
Sugar Co. v. FTC, 22 F. 2d 122 (C.A. 8th, 1927); Konecky v. Jewish Press, 288 Fed. 179
(C.A. 8th, 1923); Metropolitan Opera Co. v. Hammerstein, i62 N.Y. App. Div. 69x, 147 N.Y.
Supp. 532 (i914), aff'd 221 N.Y. 507, 1x6 N.E. io6i (1917), a covenant not to give grand opera
in Boston or New York for i5 years. Held, producing an opera was not commerce or trade, and

interstate commerce was not directly affected. Subsequent cases extending the scope of interstate commerce and the meaning of commerce make it extremely unlikely that these cases
are still the law. In United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (i947), however, the
Supreme Court refused to find the requisite interstate commerce in local Chicago taxicab
operations, although such commerce was found with respect to two other aspects of the conspiracy charged in respect to the sale and interstation operations of the taxicabs. The government had stressed the last two aspects and had not attempted to spell out the indirect interstate commerce affected by the first aspect. But the case came up on a motion to dismiss and is
a departure from the normal hesitation to dismiss because of doubts as to the interstate
commerce alleged, if by any reasonable possibility an inquiry into the merits might show
the necessary commerce. Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 (1923);
Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291, 305, 306 (1923); cf. Davis v. A. Booth & Co., 131
Fed. 31 (C.A. 6th, 19o4), cert. den. i9S U.S. 636 (i9o4).
NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 14o F. 2d 5i, 53 (C.A. 4 th, 1944), cert. den. 321 U.S.

795 (i944). See also NLRB v. Gluek Brewing Co., r44 F. 2d 847 (C.A. 8th, i944); Williams v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 3 x5 U.S. 386 (1942); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 6oi, 6o6 (i939);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
7o Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 224 (1947); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. I5O, 225 n. 59 (1940); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 6oi, 6o6 (i939); O'Brien v.
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Recovery under a state anti-trust statute is not barred because interstate activity is involved. "Indeed the joint applicability of the Sherman
7
Act and state anti-trust legislation has scarcely ever been questioned." '
Even though a state anti-trust statute may be more narrow than the
Sherman Act, or altogether absent, since the Sherman Act is part of the
law of the land, the state courts properly can and should test the validity
of a transaction by the Sherman Act as well as its own local anti-trust
rules.7 2 Because of the strength of the public policy of the common law
against restraints of trade and monopoly, courts might conceivably resort
to broader common-law principles when faced with a more narrow
73
statute.
It is against the foregoing background of law that we proceed to sketch
a scene of restraint and monopoly in which many of us play a part.
III. THE PROrESSIONs

It is somewhat odd to find it urged today that the learned professions
are not within the anti-trust laws. Just why the "learned" should be free
to employ economic restrictions, while the less learned may not, is not
United States, 29o Fed. 185 (C.A. 6th, 1923); Steers v. United States, 192 Fed. i (C.A. 6th,
1911); nor is a conspiracy to monopolize to be measured by the ratio of the defendant's business to that of the industry as a whole. Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wilborg Corp., 83 F.
2d 764 (C.A. 6th, 1936).
71Leader Theatre Corp. v. Randforce, i86 N.Y. Misc. 280, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 304, 307 (i945).
Accord: Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 172 P. 2d 867
(1946); Commonwealth v. McHugh, 93 N.E. 2d 751 (Mass., i95o). Compare Jack v. Kansas,
199 U.S. 372 (i9o5); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 735, 55 P. 2d 329, 341 (i945);
Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948), noted in 36 Calif. L. Rev. 487 (1948).
72 Schill v. Remington-Putnam, 182 Md. 153, 31 A. 2d 467 (x943); White Star Line v.
Star Line of Steamers, 141 Mich. 604, 1o5 N.W. 135 (I9o5); Metropolitan Opera Co. v.
Hammerstein, 162 N.Y. App. Div. 691, 147 N.Y. Supp. 532 (1914), aff'd 221 N.Y. 507, i16
N.E. io6i (1917); American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 N.Y. Misc. 44i,
149 N.Y. Supp. 6 (i914). Compare MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S.
402 (1947); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (i947); McCann v. Whitney, 1o5 N.Y.L.J. 396, C.C.H.
Trade Reg. Serv. 52,524 (Sup. Ct. N.Y., 1941), judgment for defendant in Sherman Act
suit in federal court res judicata in subsequent action under New York anti-trust statutes on
same set of facts; held, single cause of action split since in first action recovery could have been
had under both acts. In Ring v. Spina, 148 F. 2d 647, 652 (C.A. 2d, 1945), cert. den. 335 U.S.
813 (1948), the court left open the question whether plaintiff could recover under the state antitrust laws as well as under the Sherman Act.

73Leonard v. Abner Drury Brewing Co., 25 App. D.C. 16i (i9o5); Graf v. Master HorseShoers Protective Ass'n, i Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 423 (i9o4); Uvalde Const. Co. v. Shannon, i65
S.W. 2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App., 1942); Rogers v. Poteet, 355 Mo. 986, i99 S.W. 2d 378, 391
(I947), cert. den. 331 U.S. 847 (i947), both applied. In Moore v. Duggan Abstract Co., 154
S.W. 2d 5i9 (Tex. Civ. App., 1941), even though the court in a previous decision had held the
state anti-trust statute not applicable to abstract title business, yet it considered it necessary
to test a restraint on the vendor by common-law principles of reasonableness.
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dear. Much of our early common-law heritage of anti-trust policy had to do
with restrictions concerning skilled callings. 74 The pursuit of a calling
was protected from tortious interference,7 - and restraints on the practice
of such callings have often been held invalid. 7' The right of an individual
to choose his own vocation has been an evaluated factor in determining
the existence of an anti-trust violation. 77 Generally, the courts in these
cases have considered such restraints injurious to the community: the
right of the individual to be unimpeded in the practice of his calling is
overshadowed by the public interest in securing the benefit of the skills
7a
which, save for the restraints, might be available.
In our society the traditional professions rank high in prestige. Yet one
rarely hears of a right to be a lawyer, doctor or engineer. But in this article
we do talk in terms of rights, not so much of a right to be a member of a
profession, but of a right to an opportunity to be a qualified "professional" man. Beyond that, we speak in terms of rights of the public in
what the professions do.
We start with the "right to work," and we discuss, particularly, the
medical and legal professions. We treat the cornerstone of professional'
life--our educational system. We focus upon restraints and monopoly
practices, including those of discrimination, which attend both the attaining of a shingle to practice a profession and professional life itself.
A. THE RIGHT TO WORK 79

The right to work, a precept of the common law, by the 17th century
had been declared to be above the King himself. s° In the abstract, the
right of an individual to follow "any of the known established trades and
occupations of the country" has long been recognized. 8' In this country,
74Exclusive privilege was the lifeblood of the guild merchant. Yet, in the Case of the Tailors
of Ipswich, ii Co. Rep. 53a (K.B., 1614), in spite of letters patent from the King, it was held
that a qualified tailor who had not received the guild's blessing could not be kept from his
occupation.
75"[He that hinders another in his trade or livelihood is liable to an action for so hindering
him." Keeble v. Hickeringill, ii East 574, 575n. (K.B., x8og).
76Note go infra.
77 United

States v. Motion Picture Patents Co.,

225

Fed. Soo, 802 (D.C. Pa., i915).

78Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n [i919] I K.B. 244; Wyatt v. Kreglinger

[19331

i K.B. 793

(C.A.).
79 For a legal survey of this problem along different lines, see Murray, The Right to Equal
Opportunity in Employment, 33 Calif. L. Rev. 388 (i945).
so Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. r, c. 3 (1623-24).
81Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36, IoS (1872); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, i65 U.S.
578, 589-90 (1897); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, X21-22 (i889); Pratt v. British
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with some qualifications, there is a right not to work.' More recently, a
right to work has become an international concept83 Despite varying
rules in the states,8 4 it seems clear that the common law and the Sherman
Act reach the marketing of services as well as trade in goods' s The word
"trade" certainly has a broader meaning in this field than the act of selling
an article,86 and the courts have not shied away from the concept of a
monopoly of manpower5s We shall discuss restraints by and within
unions later in this article. Here, we may point out that associations and
their members are not free to restrict the employment opportunities either
of their members or of others. 81 We shall also discuss certain types of
Medical Ass'n, [i919] i K.B. 244; Frazer v. Shelton, 320 Ill. 253, 265, i5o N.E. 696, 70I (1926):
"The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an inalienable right. That right
is one of the blessings of liberty, and is accorded as a privilege to the citizens of the United
States by the preamble to the Federal Constitution, and the Declaration of Independence,
under the language 'pursuit of happiness."' Cook v. Mathis Co., 6r A. 2d 585 (Sup. Ct. N.J.,
1948) (the right to work is a property right protected by a court of equity). But see Louisville
v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W. 2d 248 (1948) (a license fee on the privilege of working).
82 Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (i945). Consult Hoague, Brown and Marcus, Wartime Conscription and Control of Labor, 54 Harv. L.
Rev. 5o, 85 (194o). In Hutchinson v. McDonald, Q.W.N. 23,41 Q.J.P.R. 67 (i947), as noted in
21 Aust. L. J. 36o (1948), an apprentice agreed not to work for others. He intimated that he
was going to another state. An injunction was obtained restraining him from working for
another employer throughout the Commonwealth and New Zealand for the remainder of his
period of service.
83 "Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment ... ." Art. 23, § i of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1948.
84 Consult page 176 supra.

8s See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 491-93 (1940).

86In Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, ii Co. Rep. 53a (K.B., 1614), the court said: "[Alt
the common law, no man could be prohibited from working in any lawful trade, for the law
abhors idleness, the mother of all evil... and especially in young men, who ought in their
youth, (which is their seed time), to learn lawful sciences and trades, which are profitable
to the commonwealth, and whereof they might reap the fruit in their old age, for idle in
youth, poor in age; and therefore the common law abhors all monopolies, which prohibit
any from working in any lawful trade." See Jones, Historical Development of the Law of
Business Competition, 35 Yale L.J. 905, 922 ff. (1926). For statements that "trade" covers
occupations as well as business, see Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286
U.S. 427 (1932); United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (195o);
United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 11o F. 2d 703 (App. D. C., i94o).
87 See LaChappell v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv.
62,657
(D.C. Mass., i95o); Commonwealth v. McHugh, C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv. 62,678 (D.C.
Mass., 195o).
"sAnderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359 (1926) (combination by an association and
its members to control employment upon vessels engaged in foreign commerce of all seamen
on Pacific Coast); Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N.E. zo85 (i9o4) (a nonmember whose
business with a member of an association is interfered with by the association's fining the latter
for dealing with him has a cause of action against the association); United States v. King,
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group action which interfere with the right to work and which may come
within the anti-trust laws.
Frigid silence, applause, posies, and orchids may be alternate rewards
of the actor today. In a more robust yesteryear, he could also expect catcalls and brickbats. But the law gave him some protection from organized
expressions of disapproval. In the early nineteenth century, no less than
a Duke took umbrage at an actor who had for some years been printing
matter which the Duke thought was obscene, false, and libelous. When
the actor was playing an unhappy Hamlet, the Duke and another arranged for organized groaning, hissing, and yelling. The actor brought
suit on the theory of a conspiracy to deprive him of the benefits of appearing on the stage. It was held that the action would lie and that the alleged
provocation was not a good defense.8 9
In the early part of the twentieth century, a critic made himself obnoxious to certain theatrical managers in New York City, allegedly because of derogatory statements about them, including some marked by
religious intolerance. The Theatre Managers Association agreed to bar
him from the theatres of their members. Criminal suit was brought under
the New York anti-trust laws. Relief was denied on the ground that the
defendants' motive was not to prevent the plaintiff from exercising his
calling, but dislike of his writings.90 The case does not seem sound in view
of the rule that if the necessary effect of a combination is to effect a
restraint of trade, it falls within the anti-trust laws, whatever may be the
intention of the parties. 9y
If two or more people do not like the way a third person thinks, if they
think he is a Communist or a Communist follower, can they combine their
economic power to bar him from making his customary livelihood? Two
years ago, ten prominent screen writers were charged with contempt of
Congress for refusing to answer questions which were designed by the UnAmerican Activities Committee to elicit whether they were Communists
229 Fed. 275 (D.C. Mass., x915) (efforts of trade association to persuade third parties not to
deal with one on its blacklist); United States v. Alexander & Reid Co., 28o Fed. 924 (D.C.
N.Y., 1922) (boycott by members of an association against third parties); Dunkel v. McDonald, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 21I (1945), aff'd in part 27o N.Y. App. Div. 757, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 921
(1946) (association of theatrical contractors having a monopoly status cannot require that
its members work only with other members in good standing, and that producers be required
to have all their work performed by such members).

9 Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick, 6 Man. & G. 205, i Car. & K. 25 (C.P., 1843).
90 People v. Flynn, 189 N.Y. 18o, 82 N.E. 169 (I9O7).

10
United States v. Patten,
U.S. 359, 363

(1926).
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U.S.

525,

543

(1913);

Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n,

272

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

or Communist sympathizers. Shortly thereafter it was reported that,
"Members of the Association of Motion Picture Producers deplore the
action of the ioHollywood men who have been cited for contempt by the
House of Representatives.... We will forthwith discharge or suspend
without compensation those in our employ and we will not re-employ any
of the io until such time as he is acquitted or has purged himself of contempt and declares under oath that he is not a Communist." 92
This statement, issued by Eric Johnston, President of the Motion Picture Association of America, and joined in by Donald M. Nelson, then
President of the Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers, 93 has
94
closed off the film market to these writers, directors, and producers.
Although combined economic action designed to restrict one in his calling or business has had unauthoritative support where the purpose was
to compel obedience to the law, 9s or to bring about a result which the doers
92The Film Daily, p. i (November 26, 1947).

93Ibid. "On the broader issue of alleged subversive and disloyal elements in Hollywood, our
members are likewise prepared to take positive action.
"We will not knowingly employ a Communist or a member of any party or group which
advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States by force or by any illegal or
unconstitutional methods."
To the same effect, consult Variety, p. 3 (November 26, 1947). According to Variety's story,
all the sessions of the industry's leaders were attended by James F. Byrnes as legal adviser.
Variety raises the question of whether there might not be an anti-trust question involved.
94 The ten brought suit in the California courts against the Association, the Society, and
numerous members thereof, for damages and for an injunction. The suit was based upon
wrongful interferences with contract of employment, a conspiracy not to employ and to induce others not to employ the ten, and a conspiracy to prevent them from exercising their
political rights. The complaint is broad enough to rest upon restraint of trade, but does not
expressly so allege, nor are any statutes referred to. Cole v. Loew (No. 541446, Superior Ct.,
L.A. County, Cal., 1947). The first trial under this complaint, which has been transferred
to the federal courts, resulted in a verdict for one of the plaintiffs and severe criticism of Eric
Johnston by the presiding judge. Earlier, the plaintiffs had dismissed the suit against the
Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers. See Motion Picture Herald, p. 33 (Dec. 25,
1948). In May of last year, these ten brought suit under the Sherman Act against the Motion
Picture Association of America, for damages and for injunction against a continued ban on
their employment. One of the bases of that suit was the shelving by Fox of Albert Maltz's
"The journey of Simon McKeever." Maltz v. Loew's, Inc., - F. Supp. - (Calif., 1950).
See Motion Picture Herald, p. 20 (May 28, 1949). Anti-trust considerations are said to have
dissuaded the motion picture industry from making Eric Johnston a "czar! with power to
banish errant movie stars. Compare Variety, pp. 3, 20 (May 25, 1949).
9SCompare Opinion of Att'y Gen. of Tex. (April 12, 1944), C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv. 57,239,
where dealer agreed not to sell liquor to retailer not authorized by federal law to purchase same,
and distiller agreed not to sell to wholesalers against whom the Federal Alcoholic Tax Unit
had brought proceedings to suspend or revoke a permit, or against whom criminal proceedings
had been started. It was held that this did not violate the anti-trust laws. Compare Opinion
of Att'y Gen. of Tex. (April 12, 1944), C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv. 57,238, where the Texas
Brewers Institute agreed not to sell to distributors violating OPA price ceilings (Institute set
up its own tests to determine violations), nor to sell to any distributor who sold beer in violation
of the law in dry areas of Texas. Opinion of Att'y Gen. of N.Mex. (Oct. 3o, 1943), C.C.H.
Trade Reg. Serv. 8,595, held that it was all right for a group of wholesalers to refuse to sell
their products to retailers who violated criminal laws by serving liquor to minors after hours.
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thought was morally good, 6 there is a great deal of authority to the effect
that private persons cannot thus substitute their judgments as to what is
lawful for that of governmental authorities.97 The regular courts subsequently convicted the screen writers for contempt; but a private concert
of action in effect created an extra-legal court by which a man's ability to
obtain employment from any producer was denied by the sanction of a
group boycott. 9s It is submitted that group action of this sort is in violation of the Sherman Act. 99
The film industry clearly operates in and affects interstate and foreign
commerce. The producers and distributors engaged in the lockout distribute pictures everywhere in the country and on a far-flung scale abroad;
these ten have had a substantial part in the making of a considerable
number of such pictures. °0 Moreover, these producers and distributors
produce pictures not only in California, but in other parts of this country
and abroad."'' Their control of the production and distribution of films is
such that there is no other appreciable market for the services of the ten
writers. Since many of the writers had established reputations, it is almost
certain that their works would have been produced and distributed in
interstate commerce save for the boycott.
However unsympathetic one may be toward the ten screen writers,
the danger of a group's using a boycott to enforce its views is highlighted
by the attempts, in some cases successful, to force radio and television
96Hughes Tool Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 66 F. Supp. ioo6 (N.Y., 1946).
97Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 6oo, 613 (i914);
Fashion Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (194i); American Medical Ass'n v. United States,
13o F. 2d 233 (App. D.C., 1942); United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 Fed. 8o0,
8o8 (D.C. Pa., r915). The latest disapproving reference to intraindustry regulatory bodies is
found in United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400 (1948).
98 Concerted boycotts have often been held illegal. Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 13 F.
2d 673, 687 (C.A. 8th, 1926).
99See cases cited note 128 infra. Early in June 1948, the Screen Writers Guild and a number
of writers brought an action in the District Court for the Southern District of New York,
against the Motion Picture Association of America, the Association of Motion Picture Producers, the Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers, seven of the eight major film
companies, and Eric Johnston. The suit was designed to relieve the writers from the threat to
their freedom to write implicit in the type of concerted action by motion picture distributors
which had resulted in the firing of the ten persons who were witnesses before the Un-American
Activities Committee. The Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Civil Rights Law and relevant
state laws were invoked. The background of the conspiracy was alleged to be a combination
to impose censorship through the Hays and Johnston offices. Consult Marcus, Anti-trust Laws
and the Right To Know, 24 Ind. L.J. 513, 538 (r949). The original complaint in this suit was
dismissed with leave to amend in November, 1948. Screen Writers' Guild v. Motion Picture
Ass'n of America, 8 F.R.D. 487 (N.Y., 1948). An amended complaint has been filed.
100 The contracts of several of the ten provided that the positive prints which move around
the United States and abroad would contain a credit reference to them.
10,Occasionally, pictures are produced in New York City. Not infrequently, the whole or
part of a picture is "shot" at a locale outside of the state of California.
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performers out of their jobs because they have been mentioned in the
publication "Red Channels" as Communists or Communist sympathizers."° '

In certain industries and trades, Negroes are so systematically excluded
that an agreement or concert of action might be inferred. I0 3 Social and
economic discrimination has a direct relationship to monopoly practices
in the pursuit of a livelihood. It has been pointed out that exclusion of
Negro businessmen and professionals from certain general markets has
enabled those excluded to monopolize the Negro markets. 0 4
Race discrimination has been used as a means of securing a white
workers' monopoly.' 5 Discrimination by unions, largely directed at Negroes, has in recent years been whittled down by the courts,"' and is
largely confined to certain AF of L unions."° Nevertheless, it was said
in 1947 that about one-fifth of organized labor excludes Negroes.' 5 Union
102 56 Time, No. iI, at 27 (Sept. r , 195o). It may be doubted that a concert of action to boycott a baseball player, exercised by a concert of baseball teams through one person designated
as a "czar," meets the tests of the anti-trust laws, whether the boycott is designed to enforce
lawful or unlawful contracts, lawful or unlawful regulations of private organizations. Compare
Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F. 2d 402 (C.A. 2d, 1949). It is also doubtful that a major league
ballplayer could be considered a member of an association which has the right to oust a member for infraction of its rules. Teams, not ballplayers, are members of the league, and in any
event the boycott extends beyond the particular league in which the player was playing.
X Myrdal, An American Dilemma 284 ff., 304 (i944). See Miller v. Brown Shipbuilding
Co., 165 F. 2d 956 (C.A. 5 th, 1948). Similarly, as to Mexicans, see McWilliams, The Mexican
Problem, 8 Common Ground, No. 3, at 3, 10 (1948).
104 Myrdal, An American Dilemma 305 (1944). "The Dilemma of the Negro business and
professional class is that the segregation they are fighting against affords them the monopolistic
basis of their economic existence." Ibid., 629-,3o, 645. As of April, i944, despite the stimulus
of wartime activity, Negroes represented only 3.3 per cent of professional and semi-professional
workers in the United States, 3.5 per cent of clerical workers, and r. 5 per cent of salespeople.
6o Month. Lab. Rev. 1, 13 (I945).
JOs"Some craft unions have discovered that the color bar is a convenient method of controlling the labor market. Hence the color bar results not only from race prejudice, but also
from a desire to monopolize the available job opportunities for the unions' white membership." Northrup, Unions and Negro Employment, 244 Annals 42, 45 (1946).
xo6 Compare Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Summers, The Right To
Join a Union, 47 Col. L. Rev. 33 (1947); Gerry, The Negro Worker and His Right To Demand
Full Union Membership, 2o Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 88 (i947). See also, Korner, The Legal Protection of Civil Liberties within Unions, [1948] Wis. L. Rev. i8.
107 Discriminatory unions are named in Negro Year Book 147-48 (1947); Davis and Lawson,
Postwar Employment and the Negro Worker, 6 Common Ground, No. 3, at 3, 8-io (1946);
Summers, The Right To Join a Union, 47 Col. L. Rev. 33, 34 (1947); Myrdal, An American
Dilemma 1299-i300, 1303-4 (1944).
lo8 Summers, The Right To Join a Union, 47 Col. L. Rev. 33, 34 (1947). The writer states
that in the plumbing and electrical trades, Negroes are almost completely excluded. Ibid., at
42. Discrimination by unions may take the form of provisions in their constitutions, their
rituals, tacit agreement, etc. Negro Year Book 147-48 (1947). It is said that some AF of L
affiliates bar Mexicans. McWilliams, The Mexican Problem, 8 Common Ground, No. 3, at i,

10

(1948).
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contracts with southern railroads which eliminate or restrict the number
of Negroes the railroad will employ are said to have been common." 9
Labor unions have been largely immunized from the Sherman Act,
when labor disputes are concerned, by the Clayton and Norris-La Guardia
Acts 10° Nevertheless, they are subject to the Sherman Act when they
combine with others to impose restraints and monopolies."' Under state
statutes and common law, there is often a broader application to unions.Y2
The monopoly position of a union in a particular labor market has
received recognition by the courts in denying to the union a right to
restrict the work opportunities of persons against whom they discriminate." 3 And even in the absence of monopoly, a union may be enjoined
from interfering with the right to work of one to whom it denies membership except on discriminatory terms." 4
We deal here, at length, with only two of the professions: medicine and
law. The professions are not commonly thought of as subjects of the antitrust laws. Lawyers, who seemingly write upon everything under the sun,
lo9
Northrup, Unions and Negro Employment, 244 Annals 42, 46 (1946). In 1949, a House
Labor Committee invited five railroad unions to explain racial restrictions on membership.
The Evening Star (Wash., D.C.), p. A-3 6 (May 31, 1949).
110 Pierce, Labor and the Antitrust Laws, x8 So. Calif. L. Rev. 17 (1945). The last extreme
immunity holding is Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945), a 5 to 4 decision. See Schatte v.
International Alliance, E82 F. 2d i8 (C.A. 9 th, x950).
"'Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947); cf. Bakery Sales
Drivers Union v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948).
"'2
Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (194); Carpenters Union v.
Ritter's Cafe, 3i5 U.S. 722 (1942); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (z949);
Rogers v. Poteet, 355 Mo. 986, zooo, igg S.W. 2d 378, 388 (1947), cert. den. 331 U.S. 847
(1947) (union members confederated to reject milk of contract haulers who refused to join
union).
"13 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731, 737, 155 P. 2d 329, 335, 338 ('944). The
union had obtained a monopoly of the supply of labor by a series of closed-shop agreements
and other collective action. The union discriminated against Negroes, not giving them full
membership privileges. A suit to enjoin discharge of Negroes because of their not belonging to
the union was successful. The court said that the union's "asserted right to choose its own
members does not merely relate to social relations; it affects the fundamental right to work for
a living." It said further: "If a union may not directly exclude certain workers, it may not
do so indirectly by prescribing intolerable or unfair conditions of membership for such persons." In Wilson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 350, 351, 197
At. 720, 722 (1938), an employee of a firm was denied membership in a union because many
of its members were unemployed. All except one firm in plaintiff's line in Newark employed
union men. In holding for the plaintiff, the court said: "A monopoly raises duties which may be
enforced against the possessors of the Monopoly... ; the holders of the monopoly must not
exercise their power in an arbitrary, unreasonable manner so as to bring injury to others."
As to right of a discriminatory union to negotiate a closed-shop contract, see Murray, The
Right to Equal Opportunity in Employment, 33 Calif. L. Rev. 388, 406 ff., 425 ff. (X945).
"14 Williams v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,
(1946).
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have abstained from writing about restraints in their own and kindred
professions. But restraints and monopolistic practices in these professions
are of sufficient breadth and significance to warrant consideration of the
applicability of the anti-trust laws.
We start from the premise that the Sherman Act "has always been construed to apply to combinations of professions or services in restraint of
''
trade in a proper case. "15
Professional services are likely to have considerable impact on interstate trade and commerce. Not only are professional men wont to cross
state boundaries in pursuit of their calling, but the affairs they deal with
are likely to be in, or cause a substantial flow of, interstate commerce.
Lawyers and the Anti-trust Laws
We lawyers are not accustomed to hear about restraints and monopolies
in the practice of law, except when we inveigh against the encroachment
of trust companies and others in the field of law. Yet bar associations not
infrequently assume they have a license to do what some of their members
would be certain other organizations could not.
Thus, it is blandly announced that, "The State Bar Association of
i)

Wisconsin, on June 28, 1947, approved a new minimum fee schedule in

the form submitted to it by its Fee Bill Committee of 1946-47. The prior
schedule adopted in 1929 was declared by the committee to be obsolete in
view of the great economic changes that have occurred since then."" 6 The
Committee had before it minimum fee schedules of thirty-three local bar
associations. Wisconsin lawyers, with keen awareness of how to ensure immunization for this sort of price fixing, have sought covert approval of
minimum fee schedules from the courts." 7 Bar associations in other states

1S Rogers v. Poteet, 355 Mo. 986, boo, X99 S.W. 2d 378,.388 (1947), cert. den. 331 U.S. 847
(X947). In American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 N.Y. Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.
Supp. 6 (1914), the court had before it the validity of baseball players' contracts. It refused to
hold that the business of baseball for profit was interstate commerce or trade under the Sherman Act. But it held that a monopoly existed as well as a combination to restrain and control
the exercise of a profession or calling. It thought that a quasi-peonage was effccted which was
"contrary to the spirit of American institutions, and is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution of the United States." The court, therefore, denied relief on the ground that plaintiff
came into court with unclean hands. Compare American League Baseball Club of N.Y. v.
Pasquel, 188 N.Y. Misc. 102, 66 N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1946).
x,6 Zillmer, The Minimum Fee Bill of the State Bar Association of Wisconsin, [19481 Wis. L.
Rev. 7.
117 Ibid., at 8: "The report contains the following recommendations to local bar associations:
"'It is suggested that where local bar associations are adopting new schedules they attempt
to get not only the endorsement of the circuit, probate, and other courts to fees involving real
estate litigation, probate matters, and any other matters where proper, but also the permission
to quote the courts in this respect in the fee schedule. This was done by the Circuit and County
Judges in Milwaukee County; for example, the County Judges of Milwaukee County permit

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS

have also sought to encourage minimum fee schedules., 8 Bar associations
in the last decade, in various parts of the country, have done much to
emasculate reciprocity of admission to the bar and to protect their own
members from competition by succeeding in having admission fees greatly
raised."x9 In Maryland, until very recently, even members of the Maryland bar have not been allowed to practice in the courts of Montgomery
20
County unless they were members of the bar of that county.
Trade and commerce are the lifeblood of an attorney's calling; the
transactions he deals in often transcend state boundaries. It is not believed that fee fixing by lawyers is on a higher plane than price fixing by
plumbers, nor less amenable to the anti-trust lawsX21 If bar association
activities in fixing fees may be brought within the anti-trust laws, so too
should their activities in excluding members on a discriminatory basis.
Bar associations have not been prominent in combating discrimination.Y

Many of them exclude Negroes; 2 3 their membership blanks not infrethe fee schedule to recite as follows: "The County Judges of Milwaukee County will apply the
following fees involved in County Court (probate) matters."'
"Every local association should endeavor to get this endorsement, for with it, some of the
arguments against the desirability of minimum fee schedules will disappear."
X18See 27 Mich. St. B. J. 42, 49-50 (1948); 17 Detroit Lawyer 122 (1949); IS Detroit Lawyer 73 (i95o); 37 J. Bar A.D.C. 66 (ig5o).
"19 In the last decade, the fee in the District of Columbia has gone from $i5 to $125. For a
lawyer admitted in Illinois to be admitted to practice in Montgomery County, Maryland, the
fee is $125. See Pennsylvania Bar Restrictions, 23 Temp. L.Q. 4o8 (i95o).
120In z943, the county-circuit court adopted a rule to this effect, with the qualification that
other Maryland lawyers could appear if associated with a Montgomery County lawyer. The
validity of this rule was attacked by a lawyer in May, 1949. Consult Evening Star (Wash.,
D.C.), p. i-B (May 12, 1949); Washington Post, p. ii, col. i (June 29, 3949).
12, A covenant not to engage in the practice of law by a vendor of a law business has been
tested by the reasonableness of the restraint. Smalley v. Greene, 52 Iowa 241 (i879).
-2 The New York State Bar Association, the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, and other New York bar associations have expressed their opposition to the passage of
the New York State Fair Employment Practice Act. See Spitz, The New York State Law
Against Discrimination, 2o N.Y. St. B.A. Bull. 8 (1948).
"23 Exclusion of Negroes from bar associations in Northern California has been noted.
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Anti-Semitism in the United States in z947 at 66
(947). Such exclusion is a matter of common knowledge.
In November, 1947, a subcommittee of the Civil Rights Committee of the Bar Association
of the District of Columbia filed a report that it was not advisable to consider or take any
action with respect to matters of general policy pertaining to racial discrimination. The General Committee in 1948 sustained a motion declaring that proposing an amendment to the
Association's by-laws, to remove the present restriction of membership to white persons was
not valid in the purview of the Civil Rights Committee. See 15 J. Bar A.D.C. 331, 333 (948).
In June of 1949, a plea was made for an integrated District of Columbia Bar with membership open regardless of race. The plea was made by a representative of the Washington Bar
Association, an organization of Negro attorneys. Washington Post, p. 9, col. 6 (June 4, 1949).
In June of ig5o, by majority vote, this Bar Association continued its ban on Negroes. Wash-
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quently contain racial questions which suggest discriminatory practices.
Membership in a bar association often carries with it opportunities of professional and economic advantage of great significance. Exclusion may
mean the difference between success and failure in the legal profession.124
Such exclusion is a restraint of trade not only in the sense that it is a
restriction on an individual's right to engage in a business or calling, but
also in the sense that the public is deprived of the benefit of the services of
competent lawyers. Thus it would seem that restraints upon a lawyer's
activities of the sort here dealt with should be within the anti-trust laws.
2) Doctors and the Anti-trust Laws: The Right to Heath2S
The medical profession has been singularly rife with restraints and
monopoly practices. Many centuries ago, the College of Physicians of
London adopted illegal by-laws limiting the number of College fellows to
twenty.126 A landmark in the creation of the rule against restraints is a
case decided in 16io, involving a physician's calling."27 In 1518 the Royal
College of Physicians was granted a royal patent by which it was given
the right to fine or imprison physicians who pursued their calling without
having been admitted to the College. Despite a medical degree from
Cambridge, Dr. Bonham was refused admittance, and when he continued
to practice, the College caused him to be fined and imprisoned. He sued
for false imprisonment and it was held by Lord Coke that the College's
privilege to refuse membership was to apply only to physicians who were
incompetent.
The generation to which this writer belongs has seen restraints in the
ington Post, p. iI, col. 7 (June 3,1950). In September, i95o, the American Bar Association re-

fused to amend its constitution to admit members without reference to race, creed or color.
Washington Post, p. i, col. 4 (Sept. 21, 1950).

24
Lyman, On the Rewards of Bar Association Activity, 22 Conn. B. J. 53 (1948); Why
You Should Be a Member of the Detroit Bar Association, i8 Detroit Lawyer 73 (1950);
ibid., at 33, a substantial numbers of lawyers serve on Bar Association Committees; cf. 33 J.
Am. Jud. Soc. 183 (1950).

"2s
There is no fully realized concept of a right to an opportunity to health in this countryBut it is a growing concept. In 1944, President Roosevelt's Annual Message to Congress contained as part of an economic bill of rights, "The right to adequate medical care and the
opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health." Zevin, Nothing to Fear, The Selected Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 387, 396 (1946).
126See Rex v. Doctor Askew, 4 Burr. 2186 (K.B., 1768).
r27 Dr.

Bonham's Case, 8 Coke *107a, 14a,2 Brownl. 255 (C.P., 16io). As an outstanding

case in common-law background of our own constitutional law, it has become a milestone
along the road that led to the'liberties guaranteed in the Constitution. See Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 30 (1926); Corwin, The "Higher Law"

Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 365, 367 (1929); Thorne, Dr.
Bonham's Case, 54 L.Q. Rev. 543 (1938).
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medical field of surprising scope and ferocity which have not yet spent
1
their force. 2S
The Coventry Provident Dispensary was founded in England about
iio years ago to secure medical care for its members and their families.
Some thirty-five years later, the British Medical Association was incorporated. Antagonism by the Association and various doctors against the
practice of "contract" medicine by those connected with the Dispensary,
erupted into organized persecution which set the pattern for similar conduct in this country at a later time. The Dispensary doctors were expelled
from the Association, were prevented from consulting with other members
of the Association, and were subjected to forms of pressure detrimental
not only to themselves, but to their patients. An English court found that
conduct of this nature entitled the plaintiff doctors to damages.129
In this country, the American Medical Association and numerous local
medical societies have ignored little in the way of restraints and monopoly
practices to retard the growth of prepaid medical care plans. 30 They have
either opposed successfully, or limited the scope of, group hospitalization
plans.131 Because of this opposition, prepaid medical plans have had only
a sporadic growth in this country. The last forty years have brought to
light such plans sponsored by unions, fraternal organizations, co-operative
12 During the first week in May, 1948, a meeting of the National Health Assembly in
Washington, D.C., brought together numerous antagonistic groups which exchanged views at
some length. To date this conference has not resulted in a lessening of the restraints in this
field, but it is to be hoped that it is a step in the right direction. Washington Post, p. i i,col. i
(May 9, 1948).
129 Pratt v. British Medical Association [igig] i K.B. 244. Said one of the defendant's
witnesses, at 273, "It is the lot of minorities to suffer." The court said, at 269, "Upon the
words 'to maintain the honour and interests of the medical profession' has been created a
powerful scheme and machinery throughout and beyond the United Kingdom.... It follows
that the defendants claim to enforce by boycott and by the infliction of ruin, their own standard of medical honour and interest throughout the country." The court went on to say, at 272,
"The plaintiffs were punished because they defeated the intended overthrow of the Coventry
Dispensary."
130 "Organized medicine has fought every manifestation of group practice, when combined with prepayment." United States Medicine in Transition, 3o Fortune, No. 6, at I56, x6o
(Dec., '944). See The American Medical Association, i8 Fortune, No. 5,at 89, 90 (Nov.,
1938); De Kruif, Kaiser Wakes the Doctors (1943); Group Practice Versus the American
Medical Association, 47 Yale L. J. 1193 (1938); see Mayer, The Dogged Retreat of the Doctors, i99 Harpers, 1194 (Dec., 1949).
131 See Porter, Do We Want National Health Insurance? ix5 Colliers, No. 4, at 20 (Jan. 27,
1945). "The House of Delegates of the American Medical Association formulated certain
principles for such plans. One of these principles stated that hospital contracts should not
include medical services." Council on Medical Service, AMA, Voluntary Prepayment Medical
Care Plans 8 (i949). Some state statutes prevent inclusion of medical services in hospital care.
See Rorem, Enabling Legislation for Non-Profit Hospital Service Plans, 6 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 5s28, 538-39 (ig3g).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

groups, municipal employees, and organizations organized for profit.' 3 2
Some large businesses have had prepaid medical care for many years. 33
For the most part, medical groups have not strongly opposed employer
sponsored plans, 34 but they have displayed virulent opposition to other
prepaid plans. 3s In the last ten years, largely through fear of "socialized"
medicine and in order to retard and eliminate lay sponsored prepaid medical care, prepaid plans sponsored by doctors have been increasingly encouraged by the American Medical Association and local medical societies. 36 By limitation of the scope of coverage, by geographical limitation,
and by requiring medical society approval of such plans and not of
others,137 the doctor-sponsored plans, praiseworthy as they may be in
other respects, show disturbing signs of monopoly and restraint.
Some ten years ago, in Washington, D.C., the Group Health Association was formed to provide low-cost prepaid medical care for its members,
consisting largely of government employees. Opposition by the District
Medical Society, supported by the American Medical Association, was immediate and violent. Doctors associated with the Association were intimidated to the point of resignation or were expelled from the District Medical Society. Hospitals cooperating with the Medical Society denied their
facilities to doctors associated with Group Health. It was dear that the
purpose of these restraints was to prevent competition with doctors in private practice. When brought to book under the anti-trust laws, the defendants justified their actions by their codes of ethics, and claimed the
right to regulate the practice of medicine-a claim which the courts
denied.138
In 1938, a physician in Tampa, Florida, brought an action against the

local hospital and the Hilisborough County Medical Society for preventing him from using hospital facilities for treating his patients. He was one
132 Klein, Prepayment Medical Care Organizations (Fed. Security Agency, Social Security
Board, Bur. of Research and Statistics, Bur. Memo. No. 55, 2d ed., June, r944); Klein and McKiever, Program Developments and Benefit Trends in Voluntary Health Insurance, i Social
Security Bull. 3 (1948); Davis, America Organizes Medicine (1941).

'33 Consult Klein, op. cit. supra note 132.
134

But see Irwin v. Lorio, 169 La.

13S

Notes 140, 162 infra.

136

Council on Medical Service, AMA, Voluntary Prepayment Medical Care Plans (1946-

1oo,

i26 So. 669 (1930).

1949).
137 See Porter v. King County Medical Soc., i86 Wash. 410, 58 P. 2d 367 (1936); Council of
Medical Service, AMA, op. cit. supra note 136. This is one element in the complaint referred
to in note 143 infra.
8
13 The most comprehensive of several opinions written in this case is AMA v. United States,
13o F. 2d 233 (App. D.C., 1942).
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of thirteen doctors whom the Society had denied membership because he
had furnished medical service on a contract basis to Latin clubs in the
city. The hospital had passed a resolution barring its facilities to nonmembers of the Hillsborough County Medical Society. A conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act was alleged, and a temporary injunction was
issued prohibiting the defendants from interfering with the physician's
practicing in the hospital. 9
Other attempts to carry out group medical activities in various parts
of the country have evoked similar restrictive action by doctors through
their medical societies and hospitals. 4° Within the last decade, so-called
enabling acts have been passed in a number of states under which state
medical societies could control all prepaid medical care plans.' 4' The importance of medical society membership has been a potent weapon used
by medical societies to control the economic relations of physicians with
42
the public and with organizations concerned with health activities.
Tampa Tribune (Nov. 5, 1938). The defendant medical society subsequently defaulted.
250 n. 87 (App. D.C., 1942).
20, 1949). As to other parts
of the country, see Shadid, A Doctor For The People (1939); Garceau, Organized Medicine
Enforces Its "Party Line," 4 Pub. Op. Q. 4o8 (i94o); Hearings before Senate Committee on
Education and Labor on S. x6o6, 79 Cong. 2d Sess. (1946); Davis, America Organizes Medicine 166 ff. (1941). Advocacy by the Milbank Fund of voluntary medical care insurance was
followed by a boycott of Borden's products, see x8 Fortune, No. 5, at i6o (Nov., 1938). The
opposition of organized medicine in Oklahoma to the prepaid medical care plan of the Elk City
Hospital and Clinic has resulted in Oklahoma polio patients being denied the use of the Clinic's
139

140As to Wisconsin, see AMA v. United States, i3o F. 2d 233,
As to New York City, see N.Y. Times, § r, p. 30, col. 5 (May

facilities. See Elk City Journal, p. x (June 30, x949); Elk City Daily News, p. i (July 1, 1949);
Elk City Democrat, p. i (July 2, 1949).

141See Klein, Recent State Legislation Concerning Prepayment Medical Care, io Soc. ServBull., No. i, at io (Jan., 1947); see statement of Dr. Frederick D. Mott, Chief Medical Officer,
Farm Security Administration, 6 Hearings, op. cit. supra note i4o, at

1182:

"Of course in cer-

tain States it has been most expedient for us to work out contractual arrangements with medical society plans. In some States it has been the only way in which we could bring any protection to our borrowers, because of State enabling... or we sometimes think of them as disabling acts... making it possible for a medical-care system at this time to exist only as one
dominated by the organized profession." See Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans,
33 Iowa L. Rev. 209, 224 ft. (1950).
Wisconsin, however, recently expressly provided for cooperatively sponsored prepaid medical care plans. The Medical Care Section of the National Health Assembly, in which AMA
representatives took part, concluded in 1948, that, "The people have the right to establish
voluntary insurance plans on a cooperative basis, and legal restrictions upon such right (other
than those necessary to assure proper standards and qualifications), now existing in a number
of states, should be removed." Washington Post, § II, p. 5 B, col. 4 (May 9, 1949).
142Medical Society membership is very important in obtaining malpractice insurance.
It is also usually a condition to taking specialty board examinations.
In Georgia, at an early date, the by-laws of the Georgia Medical Society provided: "No
member of this society shall consult with or recognize as a regular practitioner of medicine, any physician who shall have become a resident practitioner for two months and shall
have failed to become a member of the society." State v. Georgia Medical Society, 39 Ga. 6o8,
615 (1869).
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In the last two years, at least four anti-trust suits have been brought
against medical societies.' 43 It has been reported that the Department of
Justice has had an investigation of medical societies under way. 44 It is the
philosophy of the Sherman Act and of the anti-trust laws generally that
the public interest is best served by competition. It follows that a right to
experiment in the field of medical care should be protected by the antitrust laws from private restraints and monopoly practices.4S
Understandings between physicians in a locality may reach the point
of controlling the entry of new practitioners into the community, and of
allocating posts in medical institutions. 4 1Medical societies, as well as
medical boards in many states, have made it difficult or impossible for
refugee physicians to practice in various parts of this country. This has
been accomplished by risidence and citizenship requirements as well as
by other devices.147 Closed hospital staffs are common in this country.
The denial of the use of hospital facilities to qualified doctors has become
a recognized evil. a5 Discrimination because of race or color is widespread
X43In October of 1948, the government filed an anti-trust suit against the Oregon State
Medical Society and other Oregon medical groups and doctors, in the District Court of Oregon.
The complaint alleged restraints against prepaid medical care plans not sponsored by the defendants, and attempted monopolization of the prepaid medical care field. The district court
found that the groups sponsoring the plan were not engaged in trade or commerce and thus did
not come within the Sherman Act. The government will in all probability appeal to the Supreme Court. During the same month, a prepaid medical care organization in San Diego,
California, brought a private anti-trust suit against the local medical society. A case brought
by the Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound against the King County Medical Society
was recently decided for the defendants. Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical
Society (Super. Ct. Wash., No. 414538). In August of this year a suit was filed in Oklahoma.
Farmers Union Hospital Ass'n v. Beckham County Medical Society (Beckham Cty. Dist. Ct.,
Okla.).
144 According to a United Press story in February of 1949, the Federal government was
carrying on an investigation to determine whether the fight of organized doctors against prepaid medical care plans violated the anti-trust laws. The Washington Post, § I, p. 5, col. 5.
(Feb. 28, 1949). "Justice Department investigators are reported active in New York City,
Chicago, Oklahoma and elsewhere." Medical Economics, p. 99 (May, 1949). And see Oregon
Journal (October 9, i949).
x4S"The content of medicine is the physician's domain. But the circumstances under
which he practices and his economic relation to society or to the individual patient are problems of organization, problems in the public domain in which the physician is only one among
the many who are vitally interested." Falk, An Introduction to National Problems in Medi-

cal Care, 6 Law & Contemp. Prob. 497, 500 (1939).
146 Hall, The Stages of a Medical Career, 53 Am. J. Soc. 327, 332 (1948). Hall goes on to
state, at 336: "In conclusion, it would appear that specialized medicine is no longer an independent profession-a free lance occupation. It has become highly interdependent rather
than independent, and it is carried on within the framework of elaborate social machinery
rather than within a free competitive milieu."
Z47 Compare Proceedings of the Annual Congress on Medical Education and Licensure,
AMA, at 45 if. (i94o).
148 See Ratcliff, Give Young Doctors a Break, Woman's Home Companion (Oct., 1948).
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in the medical field. We will refer later to discrimination by educational institutions,149 a discrimination recognized as an effective restraint on civil
rights.150 It has been pointed out that "[hiospital appointments are crucial
for successful medical practice,""'1 and that where a doctor has served his
internship is an economic factor of great importance.s " But hospital internships and appointments have not been freely made available to
Jews' S and have been largely barred to Negroes."54 In the nation's capital
and in most southern states, Negro doctors have been widely denied the
use of hospital facilities. s' In Washington, D.C., until very recently, there
was only one hospital whose facilities were open to Negro physicians, and
most are still closed to them."s6 Many hospitals, moreover, do not take
' T
Negro patients at all, or only on a segregated basis.
Until recently, Negro doctors in seventeen states and the District of
Columbia were excluded from their county medical societies; this is still
'49 See pages 205-8 infra. See statement by Dr. W. Montague Cobb, as to Chicago, reported in PM, § I, p. II, col. 2 (May 11, 1948).
ISO
President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights 73 (1947).
"'1Hall, The Stages of a Medical Career, 53 Am. J. Soc. 327, 330 (1948).
'S2 "The internship that a doctor has served is a distinctive badge; it is one of the most
enduring criteria in the evaluation of his status." Ibid.
s3Hall reports the following remarks from the head of a department of a hospital: "Another reason for not holding competitive examinations for internships is that there are a lot of
Jews in medicine." Ibid., at 331.
"54 President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights 73-74 (I947).
' "Until the Flint-Goodridge Hospital was built in New Orleans with the assistance of
the Rosenwald Fund and the General Education Board, there was not a single modern hospital
in Louisiana where a Negro physician could practice. In Mississippi... there are no modern
hospitals where a Negro physician may take his patients. A corresponding situation prevails
in most of the other southern states. North and South Carolina are an exception due mainly
to the assistance of the Duke Endowment fund." Myrdal, An American Dilemma 323 (1944).
There exist few opportunities in white hospitals for Negro doctors to acquire the experience
necessary for good hospital practice. Negro Year Book 331-37 (1947). In the North, the choice
of hospital facilities is much greater for white doctors than for Negro physicians or surgeons.
Myrdal, An American Dilemna 323 (1944). In 1938, a report made by a committee of the
Medico-Chirurgical Society of the District of Columbia stated: "At present there is no hospital in the United States which offers an opportunity for training of the Negro general practitioner in the early recognition and care of pulmonary tuberculosis." Cobb, The First Negro
Medical Society 73 (i939). See Comely, Race Relations in Community Health Organization, 36 Am. J. Pub. Health 984, 990 ft. (1946).
156 Freedmens Hospital has regularly been open to Negroes. See Cobb, The First Negro
Medical Society 85 (z939).
5 Dr. W. Montague Cobb noted that in Chicago a large majority of the city's voluntary
hospitals did not admit Negroes, Mexicans, Filipinos or Japanese. PM, § I, p. 11, col. 2 (May
i, 1948). See McWilliams, Los Angeles: An Emerging Pattern, 9 Common Ground No. 3,
at 3, 8 (Spring, 1949). "The doctors said the county has no facilities for Negro patients...."
Prince Georges County Commissioners, voting against enlarging the Prince Georges Hos-

pital at Cheverly, Md. Washington Post, § I, p. r4, col. 5 (May 11, 1949).
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true in most of those states. This means they have been ineligible for membership in the American Medical Association, since membership in the
former has been a prerequisite to membership in the latter.'1s More than
in most fields, membership in these medical societies is an important factor in the economic success of a doctor, in his ability to maintain and advance his skills and in the kind of service he can render the public.' s9 For
the most part, one not a member of these societies is denied access to hospitals. Earning opportunities are often in the control of medical societies;
in many states this is true of prepaid medical care plans provided for by
the Farm Security Administration or other duly authorized government
agency. 6 ° Denial by such associations of admission to Negro doctors has
such serious economic consequences in the practice of a physician's calling;' 61 and is so injurious to the public, that anti-trust laws could properly
be invoked to rectify the public and private wrongs involved.
158 Comely, Race Relations in Community Health Organization, 36 Am. J. Pub. Health
984,990-91 (1946); PM, § I, p. ii, col. x (April 29, 1948). In State v. Georgia Medical Society,
38 Ga. 6o8 (1869), it appeared that the medical society had expelled a white doctor for becoming surety on the bond of certain colored persons, one of whom had been elected to public
office. Negro nurses have been barred from membership in a number of the local chapters of
the American Nurses' Association. That Association recently voted to allow colored nurses to
join ANA directly in states where they are barred from local affiliated groups. They have been
barred in the nation's capital by the District Association of Graduate Nurses. Evening Star
(Wash., D.C.), p. A-5 (June 2, 1948).
'59 A Senate Committee, investigating the exclusionary policy of the District of Columbia
Medical Society in x870 found:
"r. That medical practitioners, above criticism in every respect, are refused admission to
the society solely on account of color.
"2. That members of the society refuse to consult with medical practitioners, thus excluded on account of color, to the serious detriment of such practitioners.
"3. That medical practitioners are shut out from educational opportunities on account of
color."--S. Rep. No. 29 (Ser. No. 1409), 41st Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (1870).
The N.Y.C. Medical Society in 1948, passed a resolution noting that the effect of this exclusion was to deny Negro doctors the right to apply for membership in other national professional societies where membership in AMA was a requisite. It was noted that, thereby, these
physicians are "restrained in the legitimate pursuit and furtherance of their professional activities." PM, § I, p. ii, col. z (April 29, 1948). That society also passed a resolution urging that the
Constitution of the AMA be changed to forbid exclusion of Negroes by component societies.
N.Y. Times, § I, p. I, col. 2 (May 19, 1948). The AMA has refused to compel its component
societies to abandon such exclusion. See N.Y. Times, p. 28, col. 5 (June 24, 1948), and Davis,
America Organizes Medicine 163 (1941). But it has been encouraging its component societies
to do so. See 27 Med. Econ. 136 (Aug., 195o).
1,0
See note 14o supra.

x61See Cobb, The First Negro Medical Society 2-3 (1939):
"The drives which create a strong and active medical society are both internal and external.
The great subjective urge to organization is the desire for professional improvement. Ethically
and actually this end always supersedes any others in a truly, scientific group.
"Another internal urge for professional organization by physicians is the guild protection
afforded by membership in the regular society. This at once confers on the ethical physician
community prestige, protects both himself and the public from the pretensions of charlatans,
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State courts sometimes have shown a reluctance to make hospitals open
their doors to all qualified doctors for treatment of their patients; reference
to the public interest has been absent or rare.x62 The use of hospital facili-

ties has a substantial bearing on commerce both intrastate and interstate.
To the extent that a hospital bars Negro doctors, it cuts off from that hospital all the business transactions and transportation that Negro doctors
might effect. It cuts off from Negro doctors the trade and commerce they
could ordinarily expect; it cuts off the trade and commerce which medical
suppliers and transportation agencies could expect; it cuts off the flow
from medical schools to hospitals of Negro medical graduates who, save
for their color, would take their internships in such hospitals; it destroys
or restricts that trade and commerce which flows from group medical care
plans, where because of difficulty of securing hospital service, Negro group
medical plans are stillborn. It has a dear-cut relationship not only to the
63
Negro doctor's professional competence, but also to his financial success.'
The fixing of fees by doctors is a form of price fixing which would
dearly seem to come under the anti-trust laws.

64

Fee and minimum fee

furthers his economic security by facilitating the establishment of just fees, and provides for
the maintenance of professional standards by interfamilial methods.
"The major external stimulus to medical organization is the demand of the community,
according to its degree of enlightenment, for the best possible service in respect to private
therapy and the safe guarding of the public health.
"The condition of segregation renders incentive along all three of these lines deficient. It
retards professional advancement by diminishing contracts and consultations, by decidedly
limiting training from institutional sources and by fostering local professional crowding and
inbreeding with consequent lowering of morale.
"The guild advantages are sustained only in part because the segregated organization is
usually so handicapped in power that it cannot by itself enforce its proper regulations. It
thus becomes possible for physicians to ignore the society altogether, with no practical loss
to themselves." See also N.Y. Star, § I, p. 20, col. I (June 24, 1948).
'62Thus in Levin v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore City, 46 A. 2d 298 (Md., 1946), the complaint alleged that the complainant had been a member of the visiting staff of the defendant,
was denied courtesy privileges, refused private rooms for his patients; a courtesy staff was
created to limit the privileges of the hospital to a small group of physicians. Plaintiff sought
injunction against interfering with his right to treat patients in hospital. Held, for defendant on
demurrer. The court, in a confused opinion, thought the hospital free to exclude any physician
from practicing there. No restraint on interstate commerce was found. See also, Hamilton
County Hospital v. Andrews, 8i N.E. 2d 699 (Ind.App., X948). But in that case, the court did
hold that it was improper for the hospital to impose as a condition, membership in the AMA.
6
1 3 Comely, Race Relations in Community Health Organization, 36 Am. J. Pub. Health
984, 990 (1946).
x64 United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 31o U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (i95o); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United
States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932); Pleaters Stitchers and Embroiderers Ass'n v. Jaffe Pleating Co.,
176 N.Y. Misc. 4' 1, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 615 (1941); More v. Bennett, i4o Ill. 69, 29 N.E. 888 (1892)
(legal stenographers); Graf v. Master Horse Shoers Protective Ass'n, i Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 423
(i9o4) (blacksmiths); Bailey v. Association of Master Plumbers, io3 Tenn. 99, 52 S.W. 853
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price fixing through group action is a common practice and one that is frequently quite open. 65 It would seem dear that the medical profession is a
66
trade within the meaning of the common law and the anti-trust statutes,
in view of the nature and effect of the restraints employed, of Dr. Bonham's Case,'6 ' and of the numerous cases in which a doctor's covenant not
to compete with the purchaser of his practice has been tested by the reasonableness of the restraint. 68 Whether doctors are engaged in a trade or
(1899) (plumbers); Gatzow v. Buening, io6 Wis. i, 8i N.W. 1003 (9oo) (liverymen); Employing Printers Club v. Dr. Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 5o9, 50 S.E. 353 (1905) (printers); Chapter No.
768 v. Gambino, 27 North (C.P.Pa.) 6 (1939) (barbers); People v. Medical Society of County
of Erie, 24 Barb. (N.Y.) 570 (1857). But see Rohlf v. Kasemeier, 140 Iowa 182, ii8 N.W.
276 (i9o8).
165 "Announcement
"Due to the increased cost of supplies and equipment, the following fee schedule has been
adopted by the Mason County Medical Society, as recommended by the Michigan State
Medical Society."
Five categories listed with stated fees for each category plus a 75 per mile charge from out
of the city limits. Luddington Daily News (Feb. 4,1946). Similar price fixing fees by the Ridgewood Medical Society of New Jersey is reported in the Ridgewood (N.J.) Sunday News, p. 14
(April 19, 1942); by five doctors in Eufaula, Alabama, reported in the Eufaula (Ala.) Tribune
(Oct. 26, 1940); by six doctors in Newport, New Hampshire, reported in the Newport (N.H.)
Argus (March 20, 1941); by the Columbia Medical Society of Richland County, S.C., reported
in the Columbia (S.C.) Record (Feb. 2, 1948); by the Hanover Medical Society in Hanover,
Pa., reported in the Hanover (Pa.) Evening Sun (July 7, 1945); by McDonough County, Ill.,
physicians, reported in the Daily Journal, Macomb, Ill. (Feb. 28, 1948). Fixing of minimum
fees by the Medico-Chirurgical Society (District of Columbia Negro doctors' society), as well
as the Medical Society of the District of Columbia, is referred to in Cobb, The First Negro
Medical Society 56-58 (1939). See Weyrens v. Scotts Bluff County Medical Society, 133 Neb.
814, 277 N.W. 378 (r938). As to pressure of medical societies upon insurance companies to
increase medical fees for insurance examinations, see Minutes of Annual Session, June 1948,
137 J.A.M.A:, No. io, at 872, 888 (July 3, 1948).
x66The practice of medicine has been assumed to be a trade in an anti-trust suit, Pratt v.
British Medical Ass'n [i919] i K.B. 244, and held to be a trade in AMA v. United States,
i3 o F. 2d 233 (App. D.C., 1942). See i8 Ind. L.J. 249 (I943). At common law, restraints upon
the practice of medicine were classified as restraints of trade. Davis v. Masoir, 5 T.R. u8
(i793); Erickson v. Hawley, 12 F. 2d 4 9 1 (App. D.C., 1926); McCurry v. Gibson, io8 Ala. 451,
I8 So. 8o6 (I895); Rowe v. Toon, i85 Iowa 848, i69 N.W. 38 (igi8). In early common law,
the calling of surgeons was considered a public calling. See Small, Antitrust Laws and Public
Callings: The Associated Press Case, 23 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 4 (I944). The operation of a hospital
has been held to be an activity for commercial purposes within a treaty permitting Japanese
aliens to lease land for such purposes. Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928); and in AMA v.
United States, supra, the Court thought hospitals were engaged in trade and commerce within
the Sherman Act and at common law. But in Rohlf v. Kasemeier, I4o Iowa 182, 118 N.W. 276
(r9o8), a combination of doctors to fix fees was held not forbidden under an anti-trust statute
dealing with commodities.
167 See page 194 supra.
165 For example Jenkins v. Reid, [1948] 1 All E.R. 471 (Ch.), applying a strict rule. The government's brief in United States v. AMA, iio F. 2d 703 (App. D.C., 194o), cited about zoo
cases of this sort.
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not, they are not outside the Sherman Act when they combine to interfere with the practice of medicine by others 16
B. BELONGING TO AN ORGANIZATION

Often the very purpose of the creation of an association is to bring together persons of certain mental or physical characteristics. It is hardly
likely that, without more, the anti-trust laws could apply to such organizations whatever their restrictions as to membership.17
Many organizations, however, have either in the national or local scene,
acquired an economic power of great significance. Membership in them
will often be a determining factor in the success or failure in a calling or
business.' 7' Some of these organizations, through their property holdings of
places of assembly, may substantially affect trade and commerce by being able to determine who may use such property 7 2 Many of these organizations with monopoly power, moreover, have disciplinary bodies prone
to assume the right to deal arbitrarily with a member so as to deny him a
73
market for his services.
It would seem that the greater the economic significance which attaches
to joining an organization, the less likely it is to fall outside the anti-trust
laws when the organization engages in discriminatory or arbitrary limitation of membership. 7 4 Thus, as we have seen, courts have looked askance
169"Whether the conspiracy was aimed at restraining or destroying competition, or had
as its purpose a restraint of the free availability of medical or hospital services in the market,
the Apex case places it within the scope of the statute." AMA v. United States, 317 U.S.
519, 529 (1943). But see Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical Society (Wash.
Sup. Ct., July 14, 1950, No. 414538), where the court took the approach that defendants'
actions were condonable because done for self-protection and in the public interest.
X70
Traditionally, the rule has been that the courts would not interfere with admission into
voluntary associations. Summers, The Right To Join a Union, 47 Col. L. Rev. 33, 37 (1947).
'7' "Negroes are materially hurt by not getting the advantages of membership in these
bodies." Myrdal, An American Dilemma 639 (1944). The refusal of the National Press
Club to allow William H. Hastie to dine in the club's dining room in Washington, D.C.,
[N.Y. Star, p. 13 (Dec. 20, 1948)] was the occasion for a correspondent to point out the handicap in their work to members of the press who are not able to get the benefit of talks which
occur at luncheons at the club. See letter to the Washington Post, p. iS (December 30, 1948).
'72Thus, The Daughters of the American Revolution own the only major public assembly
hall (Constitution Hall) in the nation's capital. It has regularly refused to allow Negroes as
an audience, although now permitting them as performers.

X73See Lloyd, The Disciplinary Powers of Professional Bodies, 13 Mod. L. Rev. 28x (195o);
cf. Green v. Blake, [19481 Ir. Rep. 242, 275, where one of the judges adverted to such bodies as
"juntas of self-constituted inquisitors."
'74 Note i9 supra; cf. American Federation of Tobacco Growers, Inc. v. Neal, 183 F. 2d
869 (C.A. 4 th, 195o).
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at a union in a monopoly position restricting its membership, 7S or at a
limitation on the number of fellows of the College of Physicians of London.z 6 The economic significance of belonging to a medical society has led
some courts to permit an expelled physician to use mandamus to reclaim
his membership.'17 The monopoly position of a billiard company has influenced a court to deny to that company the right to exclude a billiard
player, without lawful cause, from entering a tournament sponsored by
it." 5 The monopoly position of the American Bowling Congress was an
element in recent court attacks against that body because of its exclusion
of Negroes and other non-whites. 179 Those attacks led to rescinding of the
ban.'5 ° Where a golf organization, such as the PGA or other sport organization, is an essential avenue to a form of livelihood, it may be doubted
that by discriminatory policies, it may block such avenue by racial and
creed barriers.' 8' The economic detriment to the individual golfer who is
denied membership in a professional organization is more apparent than
likelihood of detriment to the public. Yet even in such case there is detriment to the public in that the public paying the entertainment dollar is
denied the full dollar's value because, where restrictions exist, they can
never expect to see certain potential contestants.
In some professions, such as law, joining dubs is a recognized method of
making professional contacts. The path to success in some professions not
infrequently leads to membership in some organization where social and
fraternal contact may be important factors in securing clients. Lawyers
are notorious "joiners" for that purpose.112 In various parts of this country, local Elks, Kiwanis, Rotary and Lions dubs have excluded Jews
from membership,' 8 3 and it may be doubted that such organizations have
x7s Page 191 supra.

176 Page 194 supra.

77People v. Medical Society of County of Erie, 24 Barb. (N.Y.) 570 (1857). But cf. Porter
v. King County Medical Society, 186 Wash. 410, 58 P. 2d 367 (1936); Weyrens v. Scotts Bluff
County Medical Society, 133 Neb. 814, 277 N.W. 378 (x938).
'28 Greenleaf v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 79 F. Supp. 362 (Pa., 1947).
179 The written rules of the ABC contained such restrictions. See the Official Bowling Guide
(1947-48). In 1949, ABC had a membership of 700,000. See Forster, A Measure of Freedom
177-78 (5950).
XSoN.Y. Times, p. x (May i3, 195o); ibid., § 4, p. 8E (May 14, 1950).
1S See Forster, A Measure of Freedom 179-84 (1950).
X82In June of 195o, an attorney filed a suit in Montgomery County, Md., to restrain the
Congressional Country Club from suspending his membership. It was announced in the Washington, D.C. papers that his complaint alleged injury to his "financial and proprietary interests, his business and professional reputation and the social reputation of himself and his family." Washington Post, p. 2 b (June 3, 1950).
18 3 See Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Anti-Semitism in the United States in
1947 (1948); McWilliams, Minneapolis: The Curious Twin, 7 Common Ground, No. i, at 61
(1946); Weintraub, How Secure These Rights? 38-41 (X949).
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a welcome sign for Negroes. It remains to be seen whether their economic
significance with respect to the effect of membership could be considered
great enough to bring the anti-trust laws into play.
The professions have been fertile fields for restraints and monopoly
practices. The range of these practices has been wide and has included discriminations based on race or color. Both the law and the spotlight of publicity are gradually making the areas of discrimination contract X84 But
sizable areas still exist, and it is believed that the anti-trust laws are one
more weapon which may be used to end those restrictions which have a
substantial economic effect.
C. TEE IGHT TO AN EDUCATION

In this country the right to an education at the primary school level is
recognized. The source of that right lies in statute rather than in judgemade law. The further one travels from the primary school level, however, the less likely is education to be considered a matter of right.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, recognizes both a right to an
education and a right to an opportunity to be educated.' 85 Those rights
can have little meaning when the opportunity of one class of persons is
substantially unequal to that of other classes because of discriminatory
action taken by groups in control of educational facilities. At the lower
levels of our educational system this discrimination generally is initiated
and maintained by a state, a lesser governmental unit, or persons acting
under color of state law. At the higher levels such discrimination is prone
to stem from private groups. Usually this inequality of opportunity results from discrimination based upon color, race, or creed. Primarily, it
has operated against Jews and Negroes.S86
8

is said that the University of Illinois gave its assurance that its professional schools
would remove potentially discriminatory questions from their 1949 application forms. Weintraub, How Secure These Rights? 55 (1949). See Berger, The Supreme Court and Group Discrimination since r937,49 Col. L. Rev. 2oi (i949); Private Attorneys-General: Group Action in
the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58 Yale L.J. 574 (1949); NAACP, Civil Rights in the United
States in 1948; Berger, New York State Law against Discrimination: Operation and Administration, 35 Corn. L.Q. 747 (1950).
rs5 See Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The economic bill of rights
formulated by President F. D. Roosevelt included "the right to a good education." Annual
Message of the President to Congress, Jan. 1i, 1944. The Selected Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt 387, 396 (1946).
8
z 6 Forster, A Measure of Freedom 117 ff. (i95o); Segregation and Discrimination in Higher
Education, io Lawyers' Guild Rev. 209 (i95o); Weintraub, How Secure These Rights? io
(1949). See Levene, The Negro in San Francisco, 9 Common Ground, No. 3, at 16 (Spring,
1949). Discrimination in education as it has existed under state law is comprehensively discussed in Mangum, The Legal Status of the Negro c. IV (194o).
2 4 It
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Such discrimination may take the form of acknowledged or unacknowledged outright prohibition. It may assume the guise of a quota system,
for the most part operating in secrecy, but with a consistency of result
which provides its own eloquence. It may take the form of abstaining from
employing members of a class as teachers. It may be expressed in a policy
5
of segregation.' '
Discrimination against Jews and Negroes in medical schools has been
notorious. 88 But such exclusion or restriction has not been confined to
medical schools. For the year 1947, it has been asserted that in the East,
"A majority of application blanks used by colleges continued to include
discriminatory questions which bore no relation to educational qualification."' 8 9 For 1948, it has been asserted that 86 per cent of the application
forms of public and private nondenominational colleges contained questions which could be used for discriminatory purpos-es. 90 It has been said
that in 1947, in the District of Columbia, "Two of the larger universities
and most of the smaller schools admit no colored students."'' American
University admitted them to some of its schools and not to others.'92 It has
93
been asserted that Princeton traditionally has not had Negro students1
In 195o it was claimed that in higher education, there is not a single first
class graduate school for Negroes from Maryland to Florida and from
Texas to Missouri. 94
The 1948 survey of the Anti-Defamation League presents a sorry picture of discrimination by colleges and universities against Jewish applicants. x s The application blanks of the college placement agency, the
American Schools and Colleges Association, has required a statement of
one's religion,9 6 as do most of the teacher placement agencies. 9 It is no
187See Prevention of Discrimination in Private Educational Institutions, 47 Col. L. Rev.
821 (1947).

288 Ibid. See also Private Attorneys-General: Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties,
58 Yale L.J. 574, 590-91 (1948); 14 The Key Reporter 3 (1949); Forster, A Measure of Freedom 177 ff. (I95o).
'89 Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Anti-Semitism in the United States in 1947,
at 28 (1948). For similar statements and examples in other parts of the country, see ibid., at
35, 48, 6o, 66, 68-69, 70, 84, 87. Compare 5i Time, No. 21, at 83 (May 24, 1948). As to the use
of such forms by Columbia University appointments office, until a complaint was filed with the
New York State Commission against discrimination, see 47 Col. L. Rev. 674 (1947).
I9o Weintraub, How Secure These Rights? 9, 4 8 ff. (I949).
'9' President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights 9 (1947).
19 Ibid.
'93 Myrdal, An American Dilemma 633, 7367 (1944).
1948 Southern Patriot, No. 4, at 3 (April, i95o).
'9' Weintraub, How Secure These Rights? 46-48 (1949).
'97 Ibid.
196Ibid., at 6o-6i.
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answer to say that somewhere there may be a school where an applicant
might be admitted to take the course of study he desires. In some instances this is simply not so. In other instances, distance and expense
make educational facilities beyond the reach of many. An applicant to
one school, who after some time is given a polite rejection, may lose half
a year or more before he can find a school of subsequent choice which will
admit him. Future success, moreover, is often related to the prestige of
the school from which one is graduated. As a matter of custom, certain
large industrial companies regularly interview senior students of particular schools. At the lower school level, segregated schools not only cause
poorer educational facilities to be available to white as well as Negro
children, but results in inferior education being provided to Negro children than to white students. The general public is not only burdened with
an inadequate, discriminatory lower school system, but it foots a higher
tax bill in support of a dual school system. At the higher level, segregation
means unequal educational opportunities with a consequent dearth of
Negroes in the professions.98
While the anti-trust laws, for the most part, are not concerned with the
person who commits a restraint single handed, it is not often that one person by himself can accomplish a restraint of widespread significance. Decisions made by our educational institutions are wont to be more than
the result of one man's acts. In almost every one of these forms of discriminations, group action and group agreement may be found. The policy may
be one determined by the board of trustees, by faculty meetings, and the
like. Subject to suit under the Sherman Act are parent and subsidiary who
have combined to violate that Act. 99 It may be doubted that a school and
its board should be able to escape the anti-trust laws on the basis of being
a single entity;200 this is all the more so where a school may occupy a
monopoly position.' It is possible, also, that certain national associations
in the educational field have played their part in establishing and main2 02
taining discriminatory practices.
In some states legislation has been enacted designed to prevent such
discrimination; more statutes of this nature may be expected.203 The
198 Negro Year Book 55-59 (947); 5 Southern Patriot, No. io (October, 1947).
'99Schine
20o
20,

Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 13 F. 2d 673 (C.A. 8th, 1926).
Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke *107a; United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F.

32 (Minn., i945).
202See Weintraub, How Secure

Supp.

20347

Col. L. Rev.

821, 823

These Rights? 6o-6i (1949).
ff. (1947); Forster, A Measure of Freedom 136 ff. (ig5o);

o
Washington Post, p. 9 (March 3 , 1949).
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courts, on the other hand, have been reluctant to interfere with the discretion of private schools in admitting applicants.204 It is apparent that
higher education is becoming increasingly important as the primary stepping stone to the making of a livelihood. The role of higher educational
institutions and vocational schools in the professions and in business is
such as to carry with it a great responsibility to those seeking an education. Educational institutions, because of their reputations, facilities, the
courses they specialize in, their location, their economic value in the eyes
of big business, may have as substantial a bearing on access to various
fields of trade and commerce as the guilds of old with their restrictive
apprenticeship practices. The right of a school to practice restraints,
therefore, is not one which should enjoy sanctuary from the anti-trust
laws.O5
IV. TEE RIGHT To HAVE A Ho=E: RESTRICTIONS ON HoUsING

"Equality of opportunity to rent or buy a home should exist for every
American. 201 In recent years, the widespread use of restrictive covenants
=7
in the United States has highlighted the absence of such opportunity.2
judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants based upon race has now
been barred by the Supreme Court, °8 and it is believed a similar ban would
exist against restrictive covenants based upon creed. The question of

validity of agreements or understandings not to rent or sell to Negroes,
204 People v. Northwestern University, 333 Ill. App. 224, 77 N.E. 2d 345 (1948), cert. den.
335 U.S. 829 (1948). Progress has recentlybeen made in limiting discrimination and segregation
on the graduate level by state universities. In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (ig5o), the Court
held that the law school which Texas had provided for Negro students was "unequal" to the
white school, but in so doing set up criteria determining equality which should knock out
segregated graduate schools. In Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), the Court
had stated that when a Negro applied to the University of Oklahoma Law School, there being
no other state law school, the state must provide for such other school in conformity with the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. See Frank, The United States Supreme Court:
1947-48, 16 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 21 n. 83 (1948). McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (795o), held that after a Negro had been admitted to a graduate school he could not
be segregated by special seating, dining, and library restrictions.
203What has been said in another connection would seem applicable here. In Alger v.
Thacher, 79 Pick. (Mass.) 5I, 54 (1833), it was said that contracts of restraint: "tend to deprive the public of the services of men in the employments and capacities in which they may
be most useful to the community.... They discourage industry and enterprise, and diminish
the products of ingenuity and skill."
20President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights 67 (947).
207 Tbid., at 67-70; Myrdal, An American Dilemma 624 (1944); Current Legal Attacks on
Racial Restrictive Covenants, 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 193 (1947); Race Discrimination in
Housing, 57 Yale L.J. 426 (1948). It has been estimated that in 1947 there were more than 200
restrictive covenant cases pending before the courts. Vaughn, Restrictive Covenants Based on
Race, 5 Nat. Bar. J. 381, 399 (I947).
2" Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (i948).
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Jews, or other members of a class because of race, color, or creed2o 9 has
not been settled by the Supreme Court." ° And in at least one jurisdiction,
an action for damages for breach of a racial restrictive covenant still lies.2X'
It is believed, however, that such agreements are within the reach of the
anti-trust laws.
The nation's capital furnishes a laboratory example to test the application of the anti-trust laws. "5oo Attend Rally to Prevent Sale of Homes
to Negroes." This was the headline of a news item on page i of the Washington Post of November 9, 1947. "The home owners were urged by speakers to sign cards,2"2 agreeing to a covenant restricting the sale of their

homes to members of the Caucasian race.... Late yesterday afternoon
Association President Liebrand reported that 8oo signatures of homeowners were collected partly from the audience and partly through solicithe white
2X3 'If
tation of volunteers during the past several days ....
29 For a suit to oust a Jewish homeowner on the basis of such a covenant, see complaint in
Garber v. Tushin (Circuit Ct., Montgomery County, Md., No. 12,894 Equity, 1947). An

aroused public opinion forced the plaintiffs to withdraw the suit.
21o
The former president of the Federation of Citizens' Associations in Washington, D.C.,
in 1948 proposed a plan as a substitute for restrictive real estate covenants. Property owners
would grant provisional options to purchase to "square captains" living in each city square of
a neighborhood. The captain would be appointed by his citizens' association. If an owner desired to sell, he would notify the captain who would ask his association for a report on the prospective buyer. If the association thought the latter undesirable, a new buyer would be found.
The owner would then have a certain time within which he could decide whether to sell to
the "unobjectionable" buyer, to another buyer approved by the association, or not at all.
If the owner sold to an approved buyer, the captain would waive his option. Exercise of the
option would prevent sales to undesirable purchasers. "Mr. Newell said he contrived this plan
after conferring 'with Constitutional lawyers and the heads of organizations who are interested in protecting private property in the District.... .' Mr. Newell had been asked by the
Executive Committee of the Federation of Citizens' Associations to study and devise a means
of protecting property which would not conflict with the decision of the Supreme Court."
Evening Star (Wash., D.C.), p. i (June 4, 1948). There is at least one reported instance of a
number of area residents combining to buy property to prevent its coming into Negro hands.
Washington Post, p. 4 B (July 19, 1948); The Guide (Wash., D.C.), pp. 4, 8 (July 29, 1948).
Whether enforcement of the option would be consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions
in the restrictive covenant cases is doubtful. At any rate, it is believed that this scheme falls
within the Sherman Act.
"'1Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W. 2d I27 (1949). For devices used to circumvent
the restrictive covenant decisions, see Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 203 (i949); Use of Options To
Purchase Land To Control Occupancy, iSMo. L. Rev. 77 (1950).
22The cards read as follows: "It being my desire to continue, as far as possible, the real
idea of the founders of Congress Heights, to discourage the sale, rent, or occupancy, of any
dwelling within the confines of Congress Heights, to any person not of the Caucasian race, I
hereby agree, upon my word of honor, to carry out said purpose and agree to sign a covenant,
when presented to me, which will forever forbid my property from being used by any person
not of the Caucasian race, and will have same recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds
for the District of Columbia, to become a part of the deed which conveyed said property
to me."
23 The term "association" refers to Congress Heights Citizens' Association.
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neighbors band together,' Newcomb asserted, 'we will keep them (the Negroes) out regardless of what the Supreme Court does and what Eleanor
Roosevelt says.' ",2"4 It is reported that in i95o a Citizens' Protective
Alliance was formed in the District of Columbia to protect the "environment" of certain neighborhoods from encroachment by Negroes.2 ' s
Section 3 of the Sherman Act, which is applicable to the District of
Columbia, prohibits agreements and conspiracies in restraint of trade and
commerce.2, 6 There can be no doubt that the above recital shows a concert of action or agreement to restrict the sale of houses. Since the Su2 7
preme Court has said such restrictions are against national policy, ' it

would seem to follow that they could not be claimed to be "reasonable."
We come, then, to the question of whether there is trade and commerce
involved. That question we shall discuss in a larger context than the District of Columbia.
2X4The constitution of the Federation of Citizens' Associations limits its membership to
white civic organizations. A recent amendment conditions membership upon officers and
delegates not belonging to subversive organizations. Washington Post (D.C.), pp. i, 12 (April
4, 1948). In view of the economic power of this federation, the validity of its exclusion of
Negro organizations is not free from doubt. Branches of this Citizens' Association still continue
to circumvent the Supreme Court's decisions on restrictive covenants. The following excerpt
is taken from The Guide, September 30, 1948, a neighborhood newspaper which circulates in
the Northeast section of Washington.
"Our neighbor, Fred Nerlich, general legman for the Woodridge Covenant Alliance, was in
last evening to deliver his weekly report on the number of squares covered and volunteer
block workers obtained in the'current project of the Alliance to cover the Greater Woodridge
area with pledges to keep this community white. To date Fred has volunteer helpers in a
house-to-house canvass in 45 squares, and an even larger number of persons actually engages,
as in the larger squares two or more workers are cooperating in getting everybody signed up.
"E. T. Deibel, 3400 22nd St., finished his entire square with zoo per cent compliance in less
than two hours. He made only one call on each neighbor; he carried the pledge cards with him
(and they really tell the whole story). As he handed one to each homeowner he said something
like this: 'Here, this is is important, please read it. It has the backing of your Citizens' Association. Do you want to continue to have white neighbors? If so, just sign this card.' The response was both prompt and satisfactory.
"One question that has sometimes been put to Mr. Nerlich concerns the 'constitutionality'
of these pledges not to sell real estate in the Woodridge area to persons other than those of the
white race. These questioners have misinterpreted the ruling of the Supreme Court on the
validity of restrictive covenants. The court did not hold such covenants to be illegal; in fact,
its decision plainly stated that 'so long as such agreements are voluntarily maintained they
violate no law.'
"The Supreme Court's ruling only prohibits other courts from enforcing covenants that
involve racial restrictions, and there is no question of constitutional or other legal rights involved in the maintenance of voluntary agreements. In fact, some lawyers believe that the
question of recovering damages for depreciation of property values resulting from the sale of
property in a covenanted area, in violation of a restrictive covenant, has not been affected by
the Supreme Court's decision, and hold that this question still awaits determination."
2"'
Evening Star (Wash., D.C.) (Sept. 8, x95o).
2,6 26 Stat. 209 (i8go), 15 U.S.C.A. § 3 (I95o).
217 Hurd

v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34 (948).
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We have in these agreements, an agreement or conspiracy to restrict the
market of each of the conspirators as sellers or landlords; conversely, there
is a conspiracy to restrict the market of buyers and renters?," "Discrimination in housing results primarily from business practices. ' ' 219 "Housing
segregation represents a deviation from free competition in the market for
apartments and houses and curtails the supply available for Negroes. '' 0

Restrictions limit the supply of housing to Negroes and thus enhance
prices.22
"Housing is a necessary of life. ' ' 2- Real property is sold and rented
every day; it is an item of trade and commerce of significant size in number of transactions and dollar volume.- 3 Offers to enter into such transactions fill pages daily in newspapers all over the country.2 4 With respect
to cities near state lines, and in the larger cities, there is a direct, substantial flow of interestate commerce involved in the lease or sale of property within the city or its suburbs. Washington residents are constantly
in transit to and from Virginia or Maryland, looking for homes or business
in those states near Washington, and residents of those states are constantly going to and from Washington for similar purposes. The Wash218 The effect of these restrictions on the landowners' market was noted by Judge Edgerton
233, 242 (App. D.C., X947), rev'd 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
2r9 President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights 67 (1947). The report
goes on to say: "These practices may arise from special interests of business groups, such as the
profits to be derived from confining minorities to slum areas, or they may reflect community
prejudice. One of the common practices is the policy of landlords and real estate agents to
prevent Negroes from renting outside of designated areas. Again, it is 'good business' to develope exclusive 'restricted' suburban developments which are barred to all but white gentiles."
-' Myrdal, An American Dilemma 6z8 (1944). "Covenants prevent free competition for
a short supply of housing and curtail the supply available to Negroes." Dissenting opinion in
Hurd v. Hodge, x62 F. 2d 233, 244 (App. D.C., i947), rev'd 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
"The really distinctive factor underlying these problems stems from the fact that, among
the basic consumer goods, only for housing are Negroes (and certain other minorities) traditionally excluded from freely competing in the open market." Weaver, Housing in a Democracy, 244 Annals 95, 97 (1946). Myrdal points up the effect of this discrimination by his
observation that "housing segregation is a factor which generally helps Negro business."
Myrdal, An American Dilemma 308 (1944).
-21Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869, 877 (App. D.C., 1945), cert. den. 325 U.S. 868 (1945).

in Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F. 2d

Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921).
Judge Edgerton, dissenting in Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869 (App. D.C., X945), remarked, at 875: "Since housing is a necessity of life, as an original question a contract of 32
property-owners that they and their successors will not sell houses to Negroes would seem to
stand on much the same plane as a contract of 32 grocers that they and their successors will
not sell to Negroes. The ultimate purpose of the combination was the advantage of its members, but its immediate purpose was to withhold a necessity from many persons by limiting the
capacity of owners to transfer their property."
=4 Not uncommonly, newspapers of one state carry advertisements for the sale or rent of
realty in another; for instance, advertisements of property in Florida, or advertisements of
property for summer residence.
=3
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ington newspapers carry considerable advertising for the sale or rent of
realty in nearby states. The indirect effect of a transfer of occupancy or
sale of real property on trade and commerce is very great. Businesses are
founded on the process of effecting a sale or rental of realty; real estate
brokers are legion; the builder, the painter, the electrical worker, and the
rise of a residential district which gives birth to a new center of commerce
for the grocer, the butcher, and others are all activated by the transfer of
realty.' s
Discriminatory housing practices have a distinct effect upon businesses,
employment, and interstate transportation.22 6 The making of restrictive
agreements would therefore seem to come within the anti-trust laws under
established conceptions of conspiracy,- 7 and the monopolistic effect of a
series of restrictive covenants would surely seem to merit the concern of
the anti-trust laws.-'
Discrimination in housing is still prevalent.229 Apart from restrictive
covenants, neighborhood associations have acted as organized extra-legal
agencies to keep Negro and white residences separated by devices ranging
from persuasion to bombing230 Myrdal mentions, as one such association,
the Washington Park Court Improvement Association in Chicago
The Seven-Mile Road Fenelon Improvement Association and the National Workers League are said to have engaged in a variety of activities,
designed to prevent occupancy by Negroes of the Sojourner Truth Hous.23"

2 Disturbances in social relations because of segregation to the extent of violence, and exist(App. D.C.,
ence of slums, have been widely noted. See Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869, 876 ff.
1945), cert. den. 325 U.S. 868 (1945); Racial Restrictive Covenants-The Functional Approach, 7 Lawyers Guild Rev. 26o (1948). And, of course, such disturbances and the existence
of substandard conditions, have a marked economic effect on trade and commerce. The interference of restrictions with transactions involving inheritance, tax sales, foreclosures, and
mechanics liens has been noted, Vaughn, Restrictive Covenants Based on Race, 5 Nat. Bar
J. 381, 394-96 (1947). The economic consequences of the 1947 riots in Detroit are noted in
Negro Year Book 241 (1947). For the effect of racial restrictive covenants on public housing
as well as upon the economic and social condition of the restricted, see letter of Raymond M.
Foley, Administrator, Housing and Home Finance Agency, to the Department of Justice,
Nov. 4, 1947, contained in the government's brief in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. i (1948).

-6

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior to the Department of Justice, contained in

the government's brief in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. i (1948), pointed out that restrictive
covenants against Indians, with the consequent difficulty of getting housing for them, have
made it difficult for them to take employment outside reservations. See note 244 infra.
=7 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (I913).
=8 Compare Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. FTC, 121 F. 2d 968 (C.A. 3d, i94o). Concerns
which enjoy greater consumer demand than others may not agree to limit their sales to a
limited number of specified purchasers. See page 211 supra.
=9 Forster, A Measure of Freedom 201 (1950).
230
Myrdal, An American Dilemma 624 ('944).
2'3Ibid.
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ing Project in Detroit.2 32 It has been said that in 1947, in the LaJolla,
California, area "[t]he Emerald Bay (Cal.) Community Association re23
fused to sell property in that area to Jews." 3
Another important bar is illustrated by Stuyvesant Town in New York,
of which the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company is the developer. Until
very recently, Negroes were barred from the development.234 Veterans'
3s
Housing Committees have screened applications on a racial basis.2 If
this sort of discrimination can be shown to have been the result of agreement, express or implied, between parent and subsidiary corporations, between individual entrepreneurs or between them and corporations, the
anti-trust laws would seem applicable.231
A primary factor in the use of restrictive covenants and in the maintenance of segregated neighborhoods is the real estate broker. Real estate
associations often use standard restrictive agreements and realtors often
unite to effect restrictions or keep "objectionable" people out of unobjectionable neighborhoods.237 The Code of Ethics of the National Association
of Real Estate Boards provides: "A Realtor should never be instrumental
in introducing into a neighborhood a character of property or occupancy,
members of any race or nationality, or any individual whose presence will
be dearly detrimental to property values in that neighborhood. ' 23S The
Code of Ethics of the Washington, D.C., Real Estate Board is more blunt:
"No property in a white section should ever be sold, rented, advertised, or
offered to colored people. In a doubtful case advice from the Public Af39
fairs Committee should be obtained."'
32These included circulating petitions, distributing inflammatory handbills and picketing.
Negro Year Book 233 (1947). It is said that the President and Secretary of the National
Workers League were indicted for conspiracy but did not come to trial on the charges. Ibid.
233 Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Anti-Semitism in the United States in i947,
at 61 (1948). The El Monte (Cal.) Chamber of Commerce has been reported as active in
1947 to revive restrictive covenants. Ibid.
34Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 Yale L.J. 426, 437-44 (1948); Daily Compass, p. 4
(August 25, 195o).
'35Seawell

236Pages

v. Macfithey, 2 N.J. 563, 67 A. 2d 3o9 (1949).

178-79 supra.

237 Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 Yale L.J. 426, 431 n. 23 (1948).
Article 34. The Portland, Oregon, Realty Board has a similar provision in its Code of
238
Ethics. It has been said that this Board has made it very difficult for the Negro population to
expand normally. Negro Year Book 214 (1947).
239
Number 15. It has been remarked that this policy of the Washington realtors has been
supported by nonmember dealers, banks and loan companies. Race Discrimination in Housing,
57 Yale L.J. 426, 454 n. 131 (1948); National Committee on Segregation in the Nation's
Capital, Segregation in Washington 30 ff.(1948). Compare advertisement in The Guide
(Wash., D.C.), p. 7 (July 29, 1948): "If you want to sell your house, I deal only with the
Caucasian race ......

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

It is believed that the anti-trust laws may properly be applied to all of
the foregoing types of restrictions.240 It is true that some courts have narrowly construed their state statutes to find realty not within the scope of
their acts 2 4 But as we already have pointed out, the transfer of real estate
is a business activity and constantly comprises or initiates a significant
part of the trade and commerce which goes on daily in every community.242
And many activities with respect to realty have been held to be within the
43
anti-trust laws.2

V. RIGHT To TAKE CONCERTED ACTION AGAINST RESTiCTioNS
The instinct to combat restraint by some form of group action is strong
in those who feel the whip lash of the restraint or by those who sympathize
with their less fortunate brethren. The 1947 Actors Equity contract with
the League of New York Theatres prohibited Equity members from ap240 Compare United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (ig5o), applying anti-trust laws to the fixing of brokers' commissions.
241See note 27 supra.
242In Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, I56 (1921), the Court said: "The space in Washington
is necessarily monopolized in comparatively few hands, and letting portions of it is as much a
business as any other."
'4 The rights of an owner who has thrown open his premises for commercial purposes to
discriminate against those who seek access to occupiers of the premises are limited. See Federal
Waste Paj'er Corp. v. Garment Cent. Capitol, 268 App. Div. 230, 51 N.Y.S. 2d 26 (i944),
aff'd 294 N.Y. 714, 61 N.E. 2d 451 (1945) (waste paper collector could maintain injunctive
action). An agreement between stone-mason contractors to restrain competition in supplying
foundations for buildings, was construed to concern a "commodity of common use" so as to
come within the New York anti-trust laws. People v. Amanna, 2o3 App. Div. 548, I96 N.Y.
Supp. 6o6 (1922). In United States v. Mortgage Conference of New York (S.D.N.Y., Civ.
No. 37-247, 1946), a suit against most of the leading banks in New York, the complaint
alleged, among other things that, "defendants prepared, published, kept current, and distributed maps of each section of New York City showing blocks on which Negroes and Spanish
speaking persons resided; iefrained from making mortgage loans on properties in such blocks;
and induced owners of real estate in certain sections of New York City to refuse to permit
Negroes and Spanish speaking persons to move into such sections." A consent decree entered
into in June, 1948, enjoins concerted action to refrain from competing for mortgages or leases
because of the race or nationality of the owner or occupant.
The common-law rule prohibiting an agreement interfering with a person's right to exercise his trade, applies to an interference with his right to engage in the real estate brokerage
business. An owner of a theatre leased to another has been held entitled to maintain a Sherlessee had given up because
man Act action for injury to his business and property where his
o
of restraints by motion-picture distributors. Roy v. Bolduc, 14 Me. 103, 34 A. 2d 479 (943);
Kislak v. Muller, oo N.J. Eq. 11o, 135 Atl. 673 (1927); Kislak v. Artof, i3 N.J. Misc. 129,
176 AUt. 899 (I934); see Roush v. Gesman Bros. & Grant, 126 Iowa 493, 302 N.W. 495 (1905);
Steinfeld v. Hausen, xSo N.Y. Misc. 295, 40 N.Y.S. 2d 683 (i943), modified 269 App. Div.
336, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 722 (i945); cf. Application of Richardson, 184 P. 2d 642 (Okla., 1947); East
Orange Amusement Co. v. Vitagraph, Inc., C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv. 52,965 (D.C.N.J.,

1943).
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pearing at the National Theatre in Washington, D.C., after May 31,
1948, unless the National's anti-Negro rule was ended. Many of the
Theatre Guild's members were said to have signed a pledge not to permit
their plays to be presented in the National while that discriminatory rule
was in effect. 2 44 Not long ago, it was reported that the Robert T. Freeman
Dental Society had boycotted two dental supply houses until an agreement was procured from the latter not to effect segregation at professional
24 5
demonstrations or educational programs.
As we have seen, good motives are not considered a justification for the
imposition of restrictions.2 46 It is not clear, therefore, at what point organized pressure, which itself restricts the carrying on of trade and commerce, but which is designed to remove a broader restriction, comes within
the Sherman Act. It has been argued that picketing to remove discrimination is not for an unlawful purpose and should be upheld.2 47 It has been
held that picketing by non-employees to encourage boycott of stores which
did not employ Negroes involved in a labor dispute, was within the NorrisLa Guardia Act and not enjoinable.248 Concert of action to remove a
restriction is more likely to be favored by the courts than concert of action to impose restrictions.241 It might also be argued that there is sufficient public policy against racial discrimination,2so that the courts would
not lend their processes to one seeking to enforce discrimination through
5
an anti-trust suit.2 1
244 Variety, p. 49 (M!Iarch 3, 1948). It is said that most of the leading playwrights signed.
Ibid. In June, 1948 the National announced that it would cease showing plays in August
and would be converted into a motion picture theatre. Evening Star (Wash., D.C.), p. i
(June 3, 1948). The National has still not returned to legitimate shows.
245
Evening Star (Wash., D.C.), p. A-7 (May 2, 1948). For other examples of concerted
action against discrimination, see Myrdal, An American Dilemma 1261 (1944).
246 See page r89 supra.
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Murray, The Right to Equal Opportunity in Employment, 33 Calif. L. Rev. 388 (1945).
See Mangum, The Legal Status of the Negro 178-8o (194o).
248 New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938). The picketers carried
signs which read: "Do your part! Buy Where You Can Worki No Negroes Employed Here."
Said the Court at 561: "The desire for fair and equitable conditions of employment on the
part of persons of any race, color, or persuasion, and the removal of discriminations against
them by reason of their race or religious beliefs is quite as important to those concerned as
fairness and equity in terms and conditions of employment can be to trade or craft unions or
any form of labor organization or association."
249Compare Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) with Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242
U.S. 526 (1917). See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 46o (i95o).
2so
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
2s'Compare Maltz v. Sax, 134 F. 2d 2 (C.A.
7 th, 1943), cert. den. 319 U.S. 772 (1943);
Moore v. Mead Service Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv. $62,674 (C.A. ioth, ig5o).
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CONCLUSION

The law is not an omnipresent panacea for restrictions on civil rights.
But, despite the Jeremiahs who deny all efficacy to efforts through laws to
efface discrimination, and whose favorite cure is "time," eradication of
discrimination through law has been an important and successful means
of attacking this problem.2S2 Some discrimination has been eliminated
through civil-rights laws in various states; more is in the process of erasure through anti-discrimination laws of the states; and the law, speaking
through the Supreme Court, has recently struck a substantial blow against
253
discrimination through its decision upon restrictive covenants.
We may hope that the anti-trust laws in the future may be increasingly
applied to eliminate restraints upon our civil rights. The approach of government authorities in this field is likely to be slow. Not only is the state
of the law largely untried, but traditional forms of anti-trust violations
such as price fixing, agreements not to compete, cartels and patent agreements are numerous enough to keep limited enforcement staffs fully occupied. 254 In some states where civil liberties are most likely to be impaired

in accordance with local sentiment, it is hardly likely that state authorities
would invoke their anti-trust acts, however broad they may be. Yet an occasional use of the anti-trust laws by the public authorities to effect a
social as well as an economic purpose has occurred in the past and may
occur in the future.
It may well be the private litigant who will make law in this field. Prior
to 1914, private litigants could not, under the court decisions, obtain in6
junctive relief against Sherman Act violations.255 But by statute,25 in2 -7
junctive as well as treble damage relief is available to private litigants.
Failure to make out a case for damage does not necessarily require denial
of an injunction to a private suitor.251 And through injunctive relief pri252See Spitz, The New York State Law Against Discrimination, 20 N.Y. St. B.A. Bull. 8
(1948); Maslow, The Law and Race, 244 Annals 75 (1946).
2s3 See note 208 supra.

254Compare Chafee, Government Control of Mass Communication 584 ff. (i947).
25SPaine

Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459 (i917).

2s Section i6 of the Clayton Act. 38 Stat. 737 (i9i4),
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U.S.C.A. § 26 (i941).

27 Tigner v. Texas, 3io U.S. 141, 148 (I94O).
258Mid-West Theatres Co. v. Co-operative Theatre, 43 F. Supp. 216 (Mich., 1941). A
plaintiff who has been deprived of an opportunity to compete need not be in the same business
as the defendant. Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F. 2d 417 (C.A. 7th, 1942).
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vate litigants have, in recent years, helped expand the scope of the anti5 9
trust laws.2

Restraints by private persons upon civil liberties and especially racial
discrimination are under attack from many quarters. But today and tomorrow men will suffer deeply, and the course of their lives will be changed
by contact with social and economic restraint on their civil rights, on what
they would desire to do today, and on what they would hope to be tomorrow. To them, the passage of time is no answer, nor is the applicability of
some law protecting someone else from what they have experienced. The
anti-trust laws in one form or another exist across the nation and in every
state. It is thought they are available to correct many of the wrongs we
have discussed. It is hoped that their application will be one more means
"To Secure These Rights."
2s9 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 162 F. 2d 520 (C.A. 7th,
U.S. 817 (1947).
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